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Through The Trap Door
Darkly: Nebraska
Exemption Policy and
The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978
I will be their vassal for life, and dig in the mine of my imagina[tion] to
find diamonds (or what may sell for such) to make good my engagements,
not to enrich myself. And this from no reluctance to allow myself to be
called the Insolvent, which I probably am, but because I will not put out of
the [power] of my creditors the resources, mental or literary, which yet
remain to me. 1
On November 6, 1978, President Carter signed into law the fifth
and most recent federal bankruptcy act,2 the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978.3 The major substantive provisions of the New Act be-
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1. Sm WALTER ScoTr, THE JOURNAL OF Sm WALTER ScoTT 80 (1950) (brackets in
original). Contrast Sir Walter's sense of duty with one commentator's cyni-
cal view of the modem bankruptcy process:
When discussing both collection of the estate and discharge, one
should be aware that the debtor and his creditors are engaged in
what could be described as a great game. The goal of the game for
the debtor is to retain as much property as possible despite the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. The exemption provisions of state and federal
law are the most plainly relevant tools for achieving this goal.
Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act: The Development of Its
Structural Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of Consumer-Debtors,
18 SANrA CLARA L. REV. 291, 320 (1978) (footnote omitted).
2. See Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. .J. 226
(1976). The bankruptcy law replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
was the frequently amended Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
Ch. 541,30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978) (codified in 11 U.S.C. (1976)) [hereinafter
cited as the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 or the Former Act].
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), (codi-
fied primarily in 11 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979) and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(Supp. I1 1979)) [hereinafter cited as the Bankruptcy Reform Act or the New
Act]. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, see Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE
PAUL L. REV. 941 (1979).
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came effective on October 1, 1979.4
The Bankruptcy Reform Act is a major achievement and has
made many significant changes in the substantive and procedural
law of bankruptcy. Perhaps the most important of the substantive
revisions made by the New Act is the enactment of a federal bank-
ruptcy exemption policy.5 However, many of the advantages (or
disadvantages depending upon one's point of view) of this federal
bankruptcy exemption policy will not apply to bankruptcies in the
State of Nebraska as a result of an obscure provision in section
522(b) of the New Act which permits individual states to nullify
the federal scheme of exemptions in favor of the local alternative. 6
I. FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION POLICY
To the debtor, the two most important facets of any bankruptcy
law are its exemption and discharge policies. 7 Both are critical to
the debtor's fresh start in life as he emerges from the bankruptcy
process;8 his discharge permits him to walk away from the burden
4. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. note prec. § 101 (Supp. 11 1979)). See 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTcY 7.02 (15th ed. 1979); Klee, supra note 3, at 942.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. I1 1979). See generally Hughes, Code Exemptions:
Far-Reaching Achievement, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 1025 (1979); Vukowich, Debt-
ors'Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV. 769
(1980).
6. See notes 25-28 & accompanying text infra.
7. See Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L.
REV. 678 (1960).
8. The United States Supreme Court discussed the fresh start policy of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as follows:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and
permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibili-
ties consequent upon business misfortunes".... This purpose of
the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being
of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property
which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citations & emphasis omit-
ted). Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act similarly recognizes that
"there is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bank-
ruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start." H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6087 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. See In Re
Bradford, 6 B.R. 741, 744 (D. Nev. 1980) ('"The objective of bankruptcy laws is
to equitably distribute the bankrupt's assets among creditors and to enable
the bankrupt to make a fresh start."). In fact, the policy of the New Act is to
bolster the debtor's fresh start by supplying him with an option to choose a
federal list of exemptions designed to ensure that his fresh start is not de-
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of his pre-bankruptcy debts, and his exemptions allow him to re-
tain at least some of his property free from the claims of his former
creditors.9 The trade-off in bankruptcy is that the debtor is re-
quired to surrender his nonexempt assets to the trustee for liqui-
dation and distribution to creditors.' 0 So, at least in theory, the
bankruptcy process offers something to everyone-the debtor is
given his fresh start and his creditors are paid part of their claims
from the proceeds of liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt prop-
erty."
A sound exemption policy in bankruptcy should not lose sight
of either the goal of debtor rehabilitation or the goal of equitable
distribution to creditors. It should attempt to strike a balance be-
tween these often conflicting interests and ensure that neither
debtors nor creditors perceive that they have been treated unfairly
by the bankruptcy process.12 Measured against this ideal, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, like its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, has failed.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 pursued a course of indirection in
attempting to effectuate the federal bankruptcy fresh start policy.
It allowed the debtor to claim exemptions in bankruptcy, but abdi-
cated the task of formulating a substantive exemption policy to the
states.13 Section 6 of the Former Act provided that:
This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws
in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they
feated by an obsolete or inadequate state scheme of exemptions. HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra, at 126. See also In re Upright, 1 B.L 694, 701 (Bankr. Ct. N.D.N.Y.
1979).
9. See Countryman, Consumers in Bankruptcy Cases, 18 WASHBURN U.J. 1, 2
(1978); Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonex-
empt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bank-
ruptcy, 31 RUrGERS I- REV. 615, 616 (1978).
10. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126; Resnick, supra note 9, at 616; Com-
ment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: State Law or Federal Policy, 35 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 630 (1974).
11. In practice, the ideal of liquidation of nonexempt assets for distribution to
creditors has not been realized. The overwhelming majority of bankruptcy
cases are no-asset or nominal-asset cases in which no distribution is made to
creditors of the debtor. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRu1rcy: PROBLEM,
PROCESS, REFORM 20 (1971); Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. U REv. 427, 435 (1974).
In light of the "breadth of exemption opportunities" under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, one commentator has gone so far as to suggest that a lawyer who
files anything but a no-asset case may be guilty of professional malpractice.
Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-For-Law-
yers Bill: Part 1. Consumer Bankruptcy, 1979 UTAH U. REV. 175, 201.
12. See Comment, supra note 10, at 630; Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Cri-
tique and Suggestions, 68 YALE U.J. 1459, 1459 (1959).
13. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 2.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than in any
other State .... 14
Thus, instead of providing a uniform scheme of federal exemp-
tions, the Former Act incorporated a local patchwork exemption
policy which varied greatly from state to state.15
This policy of deferring to state exemption schemes was not fa-
vored by commentators. Exemptions in some states were criti-
cized as being obsolete and "parsimonious in the extreme,"1 6 while
in other states exemptions were perceived as being overly gener-
ous to debtors and unfair to creditors.1 7 The result was a bank-
ruptcy exemption policy which treated debtors and creditors
unequally based solely upon the domicile of the debtor.18 Another
14. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1978) (Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30
"Stat. 544, as amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 847 (1938)).
15. See P. MuPaHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 17.12 (1980); Country-
man, supra note 7, at 681. It could be argued that the incorporation of state
exemption law into a federal bankruptcy act is violative of the constitutional
power of Congress to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. However, this
question was resolved in 1902 by the United States Supreme Court in Hano-
ver Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), where the constitutionality of
section 6 of the Former Act was upheld. Chief Justice Fuller, writing for the
Court, rejected the uniformity attack on the grounds that the uniformity re-
quired "is geographical and not personal." Id. at 188. This theory should ap-
ply with equal force in support of section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
See In re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1980) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Ohio statute creating exemptions only in bankruptcy); Ulrich, Vir-
ginia's Exemption Statutes-The Needfor Reform and a Proposed Revision,
37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 128 n.6 (1980). But see Hertz, Bankruptcy Code
Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State Law, 54 AM. BANcKR. L.J. 339, 341-44
(1980) (arguing that the provision of § 522(b) (1) of the New Act that permits
the states to opt out of the federal list of exemptions in favor of the local list
may be an improper delegation by Congress of its legislative power).
16. Countryman, supra note 9, at 2-3. See also COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
171 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. This criticism was
aimed especially at exemption laws effective in states east of the Mississippi
River. See MURPHY, supra note 15, at § 17.12; Kennedy, Limitation of Exemp-
tions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. REV. 445, 449 (1960).
17. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 171; Countryman, supra note 9, at
3. To the extent that state exemption laws are excessively generous and pro-
tect more of the debtor's property than is necessary for his fresh start, they
impede the federal bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution to creditors.
See In re Bradford, 6 B.R. 741, 744 ( D. Nev. 1980); notes 10-12 & accompanying
text supra. It has also been argued that overly liberal exemption laws may
retard consumer credit and foster irresponsible spending habits. See Costa,
Bankruptcy: The Legal Whipping Boy, 49 ST. JOHN'S L, REV. 52, 67 (1974);
Comment, YALE L.J., supra note 12, at 1459.
18. See Vukowich, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposal Regarding Bank-
rupts' Exemption Rights 63 CAiF. L. REV. 1439, 1441-42 (1975).
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objection was that "[s]tate exemption laws are not designed pri-
marily for use in a system of orderly liquidation where all of the
debtor's estate is to be converted into cash, but in a system of
piecemeal liquidation where each creditor levies upon and sells
such property as he can locate."' 9 Thus, the bankruptcy courts
were left with the difficult task of administering fifty separate
schemes of state exemptions that were designed for the typical
debt collection process and not for liquidation bankruptcy.
However, the Former Act's deference to nonbankruptcy law for
an exemption policy in bankruptcy was not without defenders
among the commentators. 20 Thus, it was argued that the individ-
ual states are better qualified than Congress to strike the appropri-
ate balance between the interests of local debtors and their
creditors 21 and that different bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy ex-
emption policies would result in an increased rate of consumer
bankruptcies. 22
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act reflects
the debate over federal versus state exemptions in bankruptcy.
The Senate version of what became the New Act followed the ap-
proach of section 6 of the Former Act and deferred to nonban-
kruptcy exemption law.23 The original version of the House bill, on
the other hand, contained a provision giving the debtor an option
to elect either a federal list of exemptions or those available under
nonbankruptcy law.2 4 As finally passed, section 522 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act compromises the differences between the
House and Senate versions-the debtor is given an option to elect
either the federal exemptions enumerated in section 522(d) or the
applicable nonbankruptcy exemptions; however, any state may
deny the debtor his right to elect the 522 (d) exemptions by passing
19. Countryman, supra note 7, at 681. See also Vukowich, supra note 18, at 1442.
20. See Kennedy, supra note 16; Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bank-
ruptcy Power, 26 CASE W.L. REV. 3 (1975).
21. See Kennedy, supra note 16. For example, in formulating an exemption pol-
icy, the states would appear to be better qualified than Congress to take into
consideration local patterns of credit extension, economic activity and cost of
living. See id. at 485-86; Neustadter, Consumer Insolvency Counseling for
Californians in the 1980's, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817, 852 (1979).
22. When exemptions in bankruptcy are more generous than nonbankruptcy ex-
emptions, debtors are encouraged to file voluntary petitions in bankruptcy in
order to protect a greater amount of property. Alternatively, when nonban-
kruptcy exemptions are more generous than bankruptcy exemptions, credi-
tors have an incentive to force debtors into involuntary bankruptcy in order
to reach more of their assets. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 3-4, Kennedy,
supra note 16, at 452; Shanker, supra note 20, at 11-12.
23. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 522(b) (1977). See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 75 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5861.
24. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 522(b) (1977). See HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 360.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
legislation specifically opting out of the federal scheme.2 5 The re-
sult is the enactment of a deceptive federal exemption policy-a
policy that promises the debtor a federal floor of exemptions nec-
essary for a fresh start, but which builds into that federal floor a
state-triggered trap door (the opt out proviso) which has already
been used to nullify federal exemption policy in a steadily increas-
ing number of states (including Nebraska).26 The opt out proviso,
which was heralded as an "important victory for the rights of
States" by Senator Wallop of Wyoming,27 is not supported by any
25. Section 522 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor
may exempt from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this sec-
tion, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under
paragraph (2) (A) of this subsection specifically does not so au-
thorize; or, in the alternative,
(2) (A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other
than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is
applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in
which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days im-
mediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a
longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immedi-
ately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a ten-
ant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest
as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process
under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. I1 1979). Unlike under the Former Act, exempt
property under the Bankruptcy Reform Act initially passes into the bank-
ruptcy estate. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act provides that the
commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate. Id. at § 541(a). In
general, the estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Id. at § 541(a) (1).
After the property passes into the bankruptcy estate, the debtor is permitted
to claim his exemptions under section 522. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at
368. See Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-
For-Lawyers Bill: Part 1. Overview and Legislative History, 1979 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 8-10; Hughes, supra note 5, at 1026-28. For a discussion of § 522(d) and
the federal list of exemptions, see notes 38-47 & accompanying text infra.
26. See, e.g. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133(B) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 222.20 (West Supp. 1980); L.4 REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 (B) (West Supp.
1980); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66.2 (Page Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-15,105 (CuM. Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1980). Although the
opt out proviso is inartfully drafted, it is clear that affirmative state action is
necessary to opt out of the federal scheme, i.e., a state may not opt out of the
system by failure to act. In re Boozer, 4 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ga.
1980). See 124 CONG. REC. H11095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. H1ll15 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Butler); 124 CONG. Rac. S17412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini); 3 COLT R ON BANKauprcY 522.02 (15th ed. 1979).
27. 124 CONG. REc. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Wallop). Sena-
tor Wallop's elaboration that the opt out proviso "is most important since
many States ... have been responsive to the needs of debtors and have liber-
[Vol. 60:219
BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
rational consideration of bankruptcy policy. In fact, it may pro-
duce more unequal treatment of debtors than did section 6 of the
Former Act, because as states with parsimonious exemptiof
schemes opt out, the gap between exemptions available to debtors
in those states and exemptions available to debtors in states that
do not opt out may widen as a result of the addition of the federal
option to the already more generous state exemptions available to
debtors in some of the latter states.28 Moreover, the perceived un-
fairness to creditors in states with overly generous exemption
schemes is not addressed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act, because
the state exemption alternative is always open to the debtor under
section 522.
Subject to the opt out proviso, section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act provides the debtor a choice of exemption schemes-
he may elect the federal list of exemptions specified in section
522(d),29 or, in the alternative, he may exempt any property that is
exempt under state or federal nonbankruptcy law3O together with
alized exemptions frequently in recent years," id., misses the point-the
most serious potential problem created by the opt out proviso is that states
that have failed to modernize their exemption statutes may choose to opt out
and thereby nullify the attempt of Congress to place a floor of exemptions
necessary for a fresh start beneath local debtors. See text accompanying
note 28 infra. See generally Vukowich, supra note 5, at 801-04. But see note 28
infra.
28. Some of this inequity may be offset if states, when opting out, use the occa-
sion to reconsider and perhaps update state exemption policy. For example,
Nebraska increased the amounts of the homestead exemption and the ex-
emption in lieu of homestead when it opted out of the federal scheme. Act of
Apr. 16, 1980, L.B. 940, §§ 2-3, 1980 Neb. Laws 1051 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-1552, 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980)). For an article stating the case in sup-
port of states choosing to opt out of the federal exemption scheme, see Lacy,
South Carolina's Statutory Exemptions And Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 S.C.
L. REV. 643 (1979).
29. See notes 38-47 & accompanying text infra. Notice that only an "individual
debtor" is entitled to exemptions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act 11
U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. 11 1979). See In re Cramer, 3 B.L 428, 429 (Bankr. Ct.
D. Ariz. 1980).
30. The Bankruptcy Reform Act specifies that the relevant state or local exemp-
tion law is that which is:
applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in
which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days imme-
diately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer
portion of such 180-day period than in any other place....
11 U.S.C.§ 522(b) (2) (A) (Supp. 1I 1979). Thus, when the debtor has a domi-
cile in one state and a residence in another during the 180-day period immedi-
ately preceding bankruptcy, it is possible that the exemption law of the forum
will not be the one applicable to the case. In re Lockwood, 6 B.R. 623 (Bankr.
Ct. SD. Fla. 1980) (debtor who filed in Florida allowed to claim exemptions
under Texas law). See 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. 1I 1979). For a list of some of
the items that may be exempted under federal nonbankruptcy law, see
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 360.
1981]
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any interest in property held by the debtor "as a tenant by the en-
tirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest... is exempt
from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law."31 Although
not completely free from doubt,32 it appears that these alternatives
are mutually exculsive, i.e., a debtor choosing the federal list of
exemptions must forgo not only state and federal nonbankruptcy
exemptions, but also any benefit provided by tenancy by the en-
tirety and joint tenancy laws. 33 However, because in a joint bank-
ruptcy case 34 section 522 applies separately to each debtor (i.e.,
husband and wife),35 each debtor may elect either the 522(d) ex-
emptions or the state and federal nonbankruptcy exemptions. 36
Accordingly, in a joint case one of the debtors may select the fed-
eral bankruptcy exemptions, and his or her spouse may claim the
state list.37
Section 522(d) of the New Act38 was enacted for the purpose of
31. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2) (B) (Supp. M 1979). For the complete text of secion
522(b), see note 25 supra.
32. See Note, The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and Its Effect Upon Tenancies by the
Entireties, 13 IND. L. REV. 761, 775-78 (1980).
33. See In re Nichols, 4 B.R. 711, 716 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Mich. 1980); In re Kimball, 2
B.R. 560,561-62 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. La. 1980); 3 COLUER, supra note 26, at j522.02;
Hughes, supra note 5, at 1028-29; Note, supra note 31, at 775-78. Nebraska
does not recognize the tenancy by the entirety. Kerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb.
663, 84 N.W. 92 (1900). Although research did not disclose a case expressly so
holding, in Nebraska the interest of an individual joint tenant appears to be
subject, during such joint tenant's lifetime, to the claims of his creditors. See
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1503 (Reissue 1979); Volkmer, Nebraska Law of Concur-
rent Ownership, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 513, 536-37 (1979). See also 4A R. Pow-
ELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY $ 618 (1979).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. MII 1979) provides that a joint case may be tom-
menced by the filing of a single petition by an individual and his or her
spouse.
35. Id. at § 522(m).
36. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 363; 3 COLZIER, supra note 26, at 522.04;
Cohen & Klee, Caveat Creditor: The Consumer Debtor Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 681, 695 (1980); Neustadter, supra note 21, at 863.
37. In re Ancira, 5 B.R. 673 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Cal. 1980). See Neustadter, supra
note 21, at 865-66. But see In re Dill, 6 B.R. 396 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ariz. 1980)
(where one spouse's equity in residential real property was protected by
state homestead exemption claimed by other spouse, the former's wildcard
exemption under § 522(d) (1), (5) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was deemed
to have been used to such extent); In re Ageton, 5 B.R. 323 (Bankr. Ct. D.
Ariz. 1980) (where under Arizona law both spouses were required to join in
claim of homestead exemption, the wife could not claim separate federal ex-
emptions in a joint case in bankruptcy).
38. Section 522(d) provides:
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection
(b) (1) of this section:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value,
in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property
[Vol. 60:219
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setting aside to the debtor "adequate possessions to begin his
that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in
a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in one mo-
tor vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any par-
ticular item, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing ap-
parel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that
are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value, in
jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400
plus any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph
(1) of this subsection, in any property.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in
any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the
debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor.
(7) Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor,
other than a credit life insurance contract.
(8) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $4,000
less any amount of property of the estate transferred in the manner
specified in section 542(d) of this title, in any accrued dividend or
interest under, or loan value of, any unmatured life insurance con-
tract owned by the debtor under which the insured is the debtor or
an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent.
(9) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a de-
pendent of the debtor.
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(A) a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or
a local public assistance benefit;
(B) a veterans benefit;
(C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
(D) alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any de-
pendent of the debtor;
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, an-
nuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability,
death, age, or length of service, to the extent .easonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the
auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the
debtor's rights under such plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or.length of service;
and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section
401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 401 (a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is tracea-
ble to-
(A) an award under a crime victim's reparation law;
(B) a payment on account of the wrongful death of an individ-
ual of whom the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably
1981]
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fresh start."39 The cornerstone of the federal scheme is the $7,900
wildcard or grubstake exemption, which the debtor may use to ex-
empt any property.40 The debtor may apply the wildcard to ex-
empt otherwise nonexempt property or to exempt partially
exempt property beyond dollar amount limitations. 41 In addition
to the wildcard exemption, section 522(d) also provides exemp-
tions for numerous categories of specific property.42 For example,
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor;
(C) a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the
life of an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent on the
date of such individual's death, to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor;
(D) a payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of personal
bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation
for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an individual of whom
the debtor is a dependent; or
(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of
the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is or was a depen-
dent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor..
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. 1I 1979).
39. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126. See note 8 supra.
40. The $7,900 wildcard exemption is a result of the combined operation of
§ 522(d) (1), which provides a homestead exemption of $7,500, and
§ 522(d) (5), which gives the debtor an unrestricted exemption in any prop-
erty in an amount equal to $400 "plus any unused amount of the exemption
provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection." 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (5)
(Supp. I 1979). Thus, as a result of the wording of § 522(d) (5), "[t]he lan-
guage of the residential allowance provision becomes surplusage, and the un-
restricted exemption is, in effect, a $7,900 allowance." Hughes, supra note 5,
at 1031. See In re Nichols, 4 B.R. 711, 718 (Bankr. Ct. E.D.Mich. 1980); In re
Upright, 1 B.R. 694, 701 (Bankr. Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1979).
41. See Vukowich, supra note 5, at 780-81. For example, in one recent case the
debtor was permitted to exempt an automobile valued at $2,500 by applying
part of his wildcard exemption to bridge the difference between the value of
the property and the $1,200 specific exemption "in one motor vehicle" under
§ 522(d) (3). In re Bagley, 1 B.R. 116, 118 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1979). See note
43 & accompanying text infra. And in In re Boozer, 4 B.I. 524, 528 (Bankr. Ct.
N.D. Ga. 1980), the court held that the wildcard could be applied to exempt
the debtor's interest in household goods in excess of the $200 per item ex-
emption created by section 522(d) (3) of the New Act. See note 44 & accompa-
nying text infra. In general, the cases have interpreted § 522(d) (5) very
liberally in terms of the nature of property which may be exempted through
application of the wildcard. See, e.g., In re Laird, 6 B.R. 273 (Bankr. Ct. E.D.
Pa. 1980); In re Nichols, 4 B.I 711 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Mich. 1980). But see In re
Smith, 5 B.R. 500 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (§ 522(d) (5) may be used to exempt only
property of the type described in § 522).
42. For an extensive discussion of the various categories of exemptions under
§ 522(d), see 3 CoLLIER, supra note 26, at $ 522.10-.20. Most of the specific
exemptions under § 522(d) are subject to stated value, use, or need limita-
tions. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 1029-35.
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the debtor is allowed to exempt (i) his interest, not to exceed
$1,200, in one motor vehicle;4 3 (ii) his interest, not to exceed $200
with respect to any particular item, in household goods, wearing
apparel, books and certain other property held primarily for per-
sonal, family or household use;44 (iii) his aggregate interest, not to
exceed $500, in jewelry held primarily for personal, family or
household use; 45 and (iv) his aggregate interest, not to exceed
$750, in implements, professional books or tools of his or a depen-
dent's trade. 6 Additionally, subject to specified restrictions and
limitations, section 522(d) exempts the debtor's right to receive
certain payments in the nature of future earnings (such as social
security benefits and alimony, support or separate maintenance),
and certain payments which compensate for losses (such as
awards under crime victim's reparation laws and wrongful death
benefits) .47
The Bankruptcy Reform Act also seeks to ensure that the
debtor's fresh start is not imperiled by contractual provision or
nonbankruptcy judicial process. For example, section 522(e) pro-
vides that a waiver of exemptions executed in favor of an un-
43. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2) (Supp. 1I 1979). The reference in this and other subsec-
tions of § 522(d) to the debtor's "interest" in property requires the exclusion
of valid liens from the computation of the value of the property which may be
exempted. In re Van Gorkom, 4 B.R. 689 (Bankr. Ct. D.S.D. 1980) (dictum).
See 3 COLLIER, supra note 26, at 522.11; Hughes, supra note 5, at 1030;
Vukowich, supra note 5, at 779. '"Thus, for example, a residence worth $30,000
with a mortgage of $25,000 will be exemptable to the extent of $5,000." HousE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 360-61.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (3) (Supp. 1I 1979). There is no limitation on the number of
items which may qualify for this exemption. Moreover, because the debtor is
free under the Bankruptcy Reform Act to convert nonexempt property into
exempt property in contemplation of bankruptcy, see HouSE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 361, there is great potential for abuse under § 522(d) (3). See 3 CoL-
LIER, supra note 26, at 522.12. It is also likely that difficult construction
problems will arise under § 522(d) (3). See Aaron, supra note 11, at 194;
Vukowich, supra note 5, at 783-85. For example, is a stereo component sys-
tem one item or several items for purposes of the value limitation? Cf. In re
Beard, 5 B.R. 429 (Bankr. Ct. S.D. Iowa 1980) (apparently treating each com-
ponent as a separate item).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (4) (Supp. 1I 1979). Notice that the value limitation with
respect to this exemption calls for an aggregate rather than a per item calcu-
lation. See 3 CoLLIER, supra note 26, at 522.13.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (6) (Supp. 1I 1979). The New Act defines "dependent" as
including a "spouse, whether or not actually dependent." Id. at § 522(a) (1).
47. Id. at § 522(d) (10)-(11). The New Act also provides other specific exemptions
for any unmatured life insurance contract (other than a credit life insurance
contract) owned by the debtor; the debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed
$4,000, in "any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of" unma-
tured life insurance policies; and professionally prescribed health aids. Id. at
§ 522(d) (7)-(9).
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secured creditor is unenforceable in bankruptcy.48 Moreover,
although a waiver of exemptions executed in favor of a secured
creditor is not invalidated by the New Act, under section 522(f) the
debtor may avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security in-
terests in household goods, wearing apparel, health aids and cer-
tain other categories of favored property, as well as judicial liens
on any property, to the extent that any such security interest or
lien "impairs an exemption" to which the debtor would otherwise
have been entitled.49 The purpose of these provisions is to protect
the debtor's exemptions, particularly his exemptions in essential
48. Id. at § 522(e). One commentator has asserted that exemptions may never-
theless be waived under the New Act by failure to file under applicable state
law and by the debtor's ommission of a claim for exemption in his schedules.
3 COLLiER, supra note 26, at 1 522.07. The same authority also argues that a
general waiver of exemptions executed by the debtor for the benefit of all
general creditors should be enforceable in bankruptcy. Id. For a discussion
of waiver of exemptions under the Former Act, see lA COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTcY 6.10 (14th ed. 1978); Currie, Exempt Property And Bankruptcy: Se-
cured And Waiver Claims, 31 LA. L. REV. 73, 79-82 (1970); Kennedy, supra
note 16, at 462-69.
49. Section 522(f) provides:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may
avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to
the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor
would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such
lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in
any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry
that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of
the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. ]fl 1979). See generally Vukowich, supra note 5, at
793-96. Section 522(f) is one of the more controversial provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act and has already generated a significant amount of litiga-
tion in the bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 6 B.R. 206 (Bankr. Ct.
N.D. Ohio 1980) (sustaining constitutionality of retroactive application of
§ 522(f) (2) to avoid nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods
that had been obtained by creditor prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act, and invalidating under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution an Ohio statute which, in effect, denied Ohio debtors the full
benefit of § 522(f)).
The debtor is also given power to avoid and exempt certain involuntary
transfers or setoffs of property to the extent that such property could other-
wise have been exempted under § 522(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)-(i) (Supp.
la 1979); Hughes, supra note 5, at 1037-40. These provisions permit the debtor
to protect his exemptions by taking advantage of the trustee's avoiding pow-
ers under various sections of the New Act, whether or not such powers are
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consumer goods, from overbearing creditors who have obtained an
unfair advantage over the debtor and his assets.5 0 In particular,
section 522(f) (2) is aimed at creditors, such as finance companies,
that loan money to a consumer debtor and take back a security
agreement covering all of the debtor's belongings.1
Theoretically, federal exemption policy concerning waiver and
lien avoidance may not be nullified by the states, because the opt
out proviso applies only to the 522(d) list of federal exemptions
and not to the other provisions of section 522.52 Thus, exemptions
under state law are protected in bankruptcy by the restrictions on
waiver under section 522(e) and by the debtor's avoiding powers
under section 522(f), whether or not the state elects to opt out of
the federal exemption scheme. Unfortunately, however, the
waiver and lien avoidance provisions do not operate in a vacuum;
they provide relief to overburdened debtors only in concert with
substantive exemption law.5 3 Thus, by opting out of the federal
scheme of exemptions, individual states, particularly those with
closefisted exemption laws, may deny their debtors much of the
prophylactic effect of sections 522 (e) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act.
actually exercised by the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)-(i) (Supp. III 1979);
Hughes, supra note 5, at 1037-40.
50. In re Fisher, 6 B.R. 206; 214 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Rodgers, 5 B.R.
761, 763-64 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Va. 1980); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126-27,
362. See COMMiSSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 173-74.
51. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 127. One of the Former Act's principal short-
comings was its failure to adequately address the impact on the debtor's
fresh start of consumer credit secured by nonpurchase-money security inter-
ests in household goods and other property essential to the debtor's well-
being. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 125-27; Lacy, supra note 28, at 673-
74. Such security interests interfered not only with exemption policy in
bankruptcy, but with discharge policy as well; creditors, especially under-
secured creditors, holding security interests in necessities frequently applied
the leverage of their position to exact from their debtors reaffirmation agree-
ments to pay dischargeable pre-bankruptcy debts. See Lacy, supra note 28,
at 675-76. In response, the Bankruptcy Reform Act reformed not only exemp-
tion law, but also the law governing reaffirmation agreements and redemp-
tion of collateral. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 524, 722 (Supp. III 1979); Lacy, supra
note 28, at 673-89.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1) (Supp. IH 1979). See In re Fisher, 6 B.R. 206 (Bankr. Ct.
N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Hill, 4 B.R. 310 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Rod-
gers, 5 B.R. 761 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Va. 1980); 3 COLLIER, supra note 26, at
522.29. But see In re Babcock, 9 B.R. 475 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. La. 1981).
53. For example, if household goods are not protected by the exemption laws of a
state that has opted out of § 522(d), then security interests covering such
goods do not impair an exemption. Thus, the avoiding powers of the debtor
created by § 522(f) (2) are essentially meaningless in that jurisdiction, be-
cause they are dependent upon the existence of a lien which impairs an ex-
emption. See Lacy, supra note 28, at 683.
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The status of exempt property is carefully provided for under
the New Act. Once property of the debtor has been exempted from
his bankruptcy estate, it is protected against most pre-petition
claims of creditors. 54 However, certain nondischargeable obliga-
tions of the debtor with respect to taxes, alimony, maintenance or
support may be enforced against exempt property, as may valid
liens that are not avoided. 55 Finally, section 522(c) (2) (C) permits
tax liens that are avoided under section 545(2)56 to be enforced
against exempt property, provided notice thereof is duly ffled.57
II. NEBRASKA EXEMPTION POLICY AND THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
On April 16, 1980, Nebraska rejected the uniform federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions.58 The author's view that sound federal bank-
ruptcy policy is disserved by the opt out proviso contained in
section 522(b) (1) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act has already been
54. Section 522(c) provides:
(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this
section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor
that arose, or that is determined under section 502 of this title as if
such claim had arisen before the commencement of the case, ex-
cept-
(1) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a) (1) or section
523(a) (5) of this title: or
(2) a lien that is-
(A) not avoided under section 544,545, 547,548, 549, or 724(a) of
this title;
(B) not voided under section 506(d) of this title; or
(C) (i) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed; and
(ii) avoided under section 545(2) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (Supp. 1I 1979). See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361;
Hughes, supra note 5, at 1035-36; Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh
Start" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 843, 852-53 (1980).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (Supp. I 1979).
56. Section 545(2) provides that the trustee may avoid a statutory lien on prop-
erty of the debtor to the extent that such lien "is not perfected or enforceable
on the date of the filing of the petition against a bona fide purchaser that
purchases such property on the date of the filing of the petition, whether or
not such a purchaser exists." Id. at § 545(2). See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1
545.04 (15th ed. 1979). Although § 545(2) applies to all statutory liens, includ-
ing tax liens, § 522(c) (2) (C) is limited to tax liens. Compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 545(2) (Supp. I 1979) with id. at 522(c) (2).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (2) (C) (Supp. MI 1979).
58. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, L.B. 940, § 1, 1980 Neb. Laws 1051 (codified at NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-15,105 (Cum. Supp. 1980)) provides:
The federal exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. 522, subsection (d),
are hereby rejected by the State of Nebraska. The State of Nebraska
elects to retain the personal exemptions provided under Nebraska
statutes and the Nebraska Constitution and to have such exemptions
apply to any bankruptcy petition filed in Nebraska after April 17,
1980.
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noted.59 However, the decision of a state to exercise its option to
reject the uniform bankruptcy exemptions is a different, although
not unrelated, issue.
Whether or not there is a uniform federal exemption policy in
bankruptcy is a question for Congress to determine, and, in light of
the opt out proviso, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Con-
gress has decided (perhaps unwisely) against absolute uniformity
in exemptions. Therefore, the proper function of any particular
state in deciding whether to opt out is not to second guess this
Congressional resolution of federal bankruptcy policy; rather, it is
to determine whether the section 522(d) exemption scheme strikes
a proper balance between the competing interests of local debtors
and their creditors. 60
L.B. 940, the Nebraska opt out bill, followed this approach and
sought to compromise the differences between debtor and creditor
interests. It rejected the federal list of exemptions as requested by
lobbyists for creditor groups. 6 1 However, in response to consumer
recommendations, 62 it increased the amounts of the homestead
exemption 63 and the exemption in lieu of homestead.64
The main purpose of this article is to examine the substance,
logic, and policy of Nebraska exemption law as applicable to the
bankruptcy process and to suggest certain changes in the sub-
stance of that law where needed to better serve logic and policy.
However, it is not a purpose of this article to assay the wisdom of
the Unicameral's decision to opt out of the federal bankruptcy ex-
emption system. Although there is clearly at stake a federal inter-
est in providing exemptions necessary for a fresh start, Congress
59. See notes 26-28 & accompanying text supra.
60. See generally note 21 & accompanying text supra.
61. Representatives of the Nebraska Banker's Association, the Nebraska Whole-
salers-Suppliers Association and the Retail Merchants Association of Greater
Omaha urged the legislature to reject the federal bankruptcy exemptions in
favor of state exemptions. Essentially, they argued that the federal list is too
liberal and would have an adverse impact on the economy of, and consumer
credit in, Nebraska. See COMM. ON BANKNG, COMMERCE, AND INSURANCE OF
THE NEBRASKA UNICAMERAL, 86TH LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REP.
No. 264, INTERIM STUDY STAFF REP. ON LR 151, M1-14 to -15 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as INTERIm STUDY]; Omaha World-Herald, Sept. 19, 1979, at 4, coL 1.
62. See INTERIM STUDY, supra note 61, at EI[-15; Omaha World-Herald, Sept. 19,
1979, at 4, col. 1.
63. The dollar amount of the homestead exemption was increased from $4,000 to
$6,500. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, L.B. 940, § 3, 1980 Neb. Laws 1051 (codified at NEB.
REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980)). For a discussion of the Nebraska
homestead exemption, see § I1-A of text infra.
64. The dollar amount of the exemption in lieu of homestead was increased from
$1,500 to $2,500. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, L.B. 940, § 2, 1980 Neb. Laws 1051 (codified
at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980)). For a discussion of the Ne-
braska exemption in lieu of homestead, see § f1-B-i of text infra.
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has expressly made each state the ultimate arbiter of substantive
bankruptcy exemption policy. By replacing the liberal federal
bankruptcy exemption scheme with the less generous state list of
exemptions, 65 while at the same time increasing the amounts of
the homestead exemption and the exemption in lieu of homestead,
the Nebraska legislature has struck what appears to be a reason-
able balance between debtor and creditor interests. However, by
accepting the task of formulating a bankruptcy exemption policy
for Nebraska debtors, the Unicameral has undertaken a continuing
moral obligation to ensure that those debtors are not denied the
fresh start following bankruptcy to which they are entitled.
A. The Nebraska Homestead Exemption
The homestead exemption, a creation of American law, 66 is
rooted in an 1839 statute of the Republic of Texas which
reserved to every citizen, or head of a family, in this republic, free and
independent of the power of a writ offierifacias, or other execution...
fifty acreas of land or one town lot, including his or her homestead, and
improvements not exceeding five hundred dollars in value....
6 7
65. The federal list of exemptions is clearly more generous to debtors than is the
Nebraska list. For example, the combined effect of §§522(d)(1) and
522(d) (5) is to provide each debtor with an unrestricted $7,900 exemption in
any property. See note 40 & accompanying text supra. The closest Nebraska
counterpart of the federal wildcard exemption is the $6,500 homestead ex-
emption, which is available only to debtors who are heads of families and
who satisfy statutory ownership and occupancy requirements. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See § 11-A of text infra. However, the dis-
parity between federal and Nebraska exemptions gives rise to one positive
effect of Nebraska's opting out of the federal scheme-the elimination of an
incentive for debtors to rush into bankruptcy in order to take advantage of
the more generous federal exemptions. See Lacy, supra note 28, at 679-80,
688-89. Professor Lacy, in urging the South Carolina General Assembly to
enact legislation depriving debtors of the right to select the federal exemp-
tion list in bankruptcy, argued that such action would prevent a significant
increase in the number of consumer bankruptcies filed in South Carolina and
thereby avoid the inevitable result-increased costs and reduced availability
of consumer credit. Id. at 688-89.
66. "Although exemptions from execution, embracing real and personal prop-
erty, were known in England at common law and also in this country at an
early date, homestead legislation appears to be a uniquely American contri-
bution to the law of real property .... " Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63
HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1950) (footnotes omitted). See Comment, State
Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1023-24 (1937). Only six juris-
dictions in the United States do not have homestead laws. Vukowich, Debt-
ors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779, 797 (1974); Uniform Exemptions Act,
13 U.L.A. CiviL PRoc. & REM. LAws 368 (1980).
67. Act of Jan. 26, 1839, art. 684, 1839 Laws of the Republic of Texas, 3d Cong., 1st
Sess. 113, reprinted in J. SAYLES & H. SAYLES, 1 EARLY LAws OF TEXAS 318 (2d
ed. 1891). See Haskins, supra note 66, at 1289; Comment, supra note 66, at
1026.
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The initial Nebraska homestead exemption law, which was based
on the law of Iowa,68 was enacted in 1855 by the First General As-
sembly of the Territory of Nebraska.69 The Nebraska legislature
passed several homestead laws between 1855 and 1879, when the
present homestead act7 0 was enacted in its original form.7 '
The most recent amendment of Nebraska homestead law was
contained in L.B. 940, the bill by which the State of Nebraska exer-
cised its right to opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemption
scheme. 72 The 1980 amendment increased the dollar amount of the
value limitation on the homestead exemption from $4,000 to
$6,500.73
The present version of the homestead exemption provides:
A homestead not exceeding in value six thousand five hundred dollars,
consisting of the dwelling house in which the claimant resides, its appur-
tenances, and the land on which the same is situated, not exceeding one
hundred and sixty acres of land, to be selected by the owner thereof, and
not in any incorporated city or village, or instead thereof, at the option of
the claimant, a quantity of contiguous land not exceeding two lots within
any incorporated city or village, shall be exempt from judgment liens, and
from execution or forced sale, except as provided in sections 40-101 to 40-
117.74
In order to qualify for the exemption, a homestead claimant must
68. Act of Mar. 16, 1855, 1855 Neb. Laws 55. See Foster, The Nebraska Homestead-
Part 1, 3 NEB. L. BuLL. 109, 116 (1924). Professor Foster's article, although
somewhat dated, remains a very helpful study of Nebraska homestead law.
69. Act of Mar. 16, 1855, § 479, 1855 Neb. Laws 102 (repealed 1860). The act, which
was referred to by Professor Foster as "the simplest homestead act ever
passed by a legislature," Foster, supra note 68, at 116, provides in pertinent
part: "If the debtor is the head of a family there is further exempt, his home-
stead as provided by law ... ." Act of Mar. 16, 1855, § 479, 1855 Neb. Laws 102
(repealed 1860).
70. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 40-101 to-116 (Reissue 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980) (originally
enacted as Act of Feb. 26, 1879, 1879 Neb. Laws 57).
71. See Foster, supra note 68, at 116. For example, in 1860 the Nebraska legisla-
ture approved a homestead act which, for the first time, placed an area limita-
tion on the homestead exemption. Act of Jan. 13, 1860, § 1, 1859 Neb. Laws 102
(repealed 1875). The act provided for a rural homestead not exceeding 160
acres, or an urban homestead not exceeding two contiguous lots, and in ei-
ther case, the dwelling house and appurtenances situated on the homestead
land. The rural homestead exemption was further limited to "the homestead
mansion and twenty acres of the land whereon the mansion is situate, and
land adjoining the same to the extent of five hundred dollars in value, .
and no more." Id.
In 1875 a new Nebraska homestead act was enacted. The 1875 act elimi-
nated the distinction between rural and urban homesteads and provided that,
in all cases, the homestead exemption was not to exceed 160 acres in area and
$2,000 in value. Act of Feb. 25, 1875, § 1, 1875 Neb. Laws 45 (repealed 1879).
72. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, L.B. 940, § 3, 1980 Neb. Laws 1051 (codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
73. Id.
74. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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satisfy three requirements:7 5 (1) he must be the "head of a fam-
ily";7 6 (2) he must, with one exception, be the "owner" of the
homestead property;7 7 and (3) he must reside in the dwelling
house situated on the homestead tract.7 8 Additionally, the home-
stead exemption is subject to a statutory dollar amount limitation.
1. Family Headship Requirement
Section 40-101 of the Nebraska Homestead Act does not ex-
pressly require the homestead claimant to be the head of a family.
However, the family headship requirement is clearly established
from the Act read as a whole7 9 as well as from homestead case
law.80 This conclusion also follows from the policy of the home-
stead exemption, which was discussed by Justice Barnes in
Holmes v. Mason:81
The act exempts homesteads from forced sale to pay the debts of the head
of the family, and is "a beneficent provision for the protection and mainte-
nance of the wife and children against the neglect and improvidence of the
father and husband." It is designed to protect citizens and their families
from the miseries and dangers of destitution. It is an enlightened policy,
looking to the general welfare, as well as to that of the individual citizen.
It is a statutory right purely, created for the benefit of the debtor and his
family.8 2
Section 40-115 of the Nebraska Homestead Act defines "head of
a family" as including every person who has "residing on the
premises with him or her, and under his or her care and mainte-
75. See In re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Neb. 1951).
76. See notes 79-106 & accompanying text infra.
77. See notes 107-47 & accompanying text infra.
78. See notes 148-85 & accompanying text infra.
79. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 40-102, -105, -115 (Reissue 1978 & Cum. Supp.
1980).
80. E.g., Brusha v. Phipps, 86 Neb. 822, 126 N.W. 856 (1910) (widow not entitled to
homestead exemption where not head of a family since no one resided with
or was dependent on her); Palmer v. Sawyer, 74 Neb. 108, 103 N.W. 1088 (1905)
(claimant was head of a family at time homestead tract was acquired).
81. 80 Neb. 448, 114 N.W. 606 (1908).
82. Id. at 453, 114 N.W. at 608. See Foster, supra note 68, at 112; Haskins, supra
note 66, at 1289; Comment, supra note 66, at 1030. Further support for the
proposition that the primary purpose of the homestead exemption is protec-
tion of the family and not the individual debtor is furnished by the statutory
restrictions on alienation of a married person's homestead. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 40-104 (Reissue 1978). See Comment, supra note 66, at 1030. See also notes
89, 105 & accompanying text infra. A probable secondary purpose of the
homestead exemption is the encouragement of home ownership. See Has-
kins, supra note 66, at 1289-90; Comment, supra note 66, at 1030-31. Encourag-
ing home ownership is no longer a compelling homestead policy in light of
the reasonable alternatives to home ownership available to the contemporary
debtor. See notes 207-08 & accompanying text infra.
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nance" any member of certain enumerated classes of relatives. 83
A literal reading of section 40-115, as amended in 1979,84 excludes
from the meaning of "head of a family" both spouses in the case of
married couples with no children or other dependents. Thus, a
person residing on the homestead property with, and supporting,
an unmarried brother or sister may qualify as the head of a family,
whereas the same person residing only with a husband or wJJe ap-
parently does not qualify. This appears to be an unforeseen conse-
quence of the 1979 amendment to section 40-115, which was
intended simply to eliminate gender-based discrimination in vari-
ous sections of Nebraska legislation and not to affect the substan-
tive homestead rights of married couples. 85
83. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-115 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The section provides:
The phrase head of a family, as used in section 40-101 to 40-117, in-
cludes within its meanings every person who has residing on the
premises with him or her, and under his or her care and mainte-
nance: (1) His or her minor child, or the minor child of his or her
deceased wife or husband, (2) a minor brother or sister, or the minor
child of a deceased bother or sister, (3) a father, mother, grandfather,
or grandmother, (4) the father or mother, grandfather or grand-
mother of a deceased husband or wife, or (5) an unmarried sister,
brother, or any other of the relatives mentioned in this section who
have attained the age of majority and are unable to take care of or
support themselves.
Id. Thus, the statute requires that the family member be related to the head
of the family by consanguinity or affinity. See Foster, supra note 68, at 120.
84. Act of May 22, 1979, L.B. 80, § 103, 1979 Neb. Laws 226. Prior to passage of this
amendment, section 40-115 provided, in addition to substantially the current
verbiage, that the husband was the head of the family when the claimant was
a married person.
85. For example, the act replaces gender-specific terms contained in many sec-
tions of Nebraska legislation with gender-neutral terms. See, e.g. Act of May
22, 1979, L.B. 80, § 82, 1979 Neb. Laws 226 (references to "father", "son",
"brother", "brother-in-law", "father-in-law" and "son-in-law" in statute relat-
ing to disqualification of judges replaced with references to 'parent", "child",
"sibling" and "in-law"). The stated intent of LB. 80, the omnibus bill that
contained the amendment to section 40-115, was "to continue the ongoing pro-
cess of removing reference to gender from the statutes." COMM. ON THE JUDi-
CIARY OF THE NEBRASKA UNICAMERAL, 86TH LEGISLATURE, 1ST SESS.,
STATEMENT ON L.B. 80 (Mar. 14, 1979). At a public hearing on L.B. 80, held on
January 15, 1979, Senator Marsh, who introduced the bill, explained its pur-
pose as follows:
The intent of LB 80 is to update language and to remove sexist lan-
guage from the Nebraska statutes. Included in the changes are po-
liceman to police officer; fireman to firefighter; he to disabled
person [;] councilman to council members .... The word sexism was
coined to denote discrimination based on gender. In its original
sense sexism referred to prejudice against the female sex. In a
deeper sense the term now indicates any arbitrary stereotyping of
males and females on the basis of their gender. LB 80, if passed, will
endeavor to eliminate sexist assumptions from statutes. Men and
women should be treated primarily as people and not primarily as
members of the opposite sex. Their shared humanity and common
1981]
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Although the Supreme Court of Nebraska has not yet been
presented with the issue, hopefully, it will interpret the amended
definition of "head of a family" liberally in accordance with the
"enlightened policy" of the homestead exemption 86 in order to per-
mit a married couple without children or other dependents to
claim the benefit of the homestead exemption. The argument for
adoption of this interpretation is further supported by the inclu-
sive nature of the statutory definition of head of a family 87 and by
case law broadly construing the family headship requirement.88
However, interpreting the family headship requirement in a man-
ner which will serve both the liberal exemption policy of the
Homestead Act and the policy of eliminating gender-based dis-
crimination from Nebraska laws will not be easy. The courts will
be required to determine which spouse is the family head and ar-
ticulating a standard for making that choice will be difficult, partic-
ularly when both spouses are working and contributing to the
support of the household. An interpretation which resorts to the
traditional presumption that the husband is the head of the family
attributes should be stressed, not their gender difference. Neither
sex should be stereotyped or arbitrarily assigned to a leading or a
secondary role. The intent of LB 80 is to update in 15 different chap-
ters the wording of our statutes.
Public Hearing on L.B. 80 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the Nebraska
Unicameral, 86th Legislature, 1st Sess. 1-2 (1979).
86. See note 82 & accompanyng text supra. "The homestead law has always been
liberally construed in this state with a view to promoting its beneficent pur-
poses." First Nat'l Bank v. McClanahan, 83 Neb. 706, 711, 120 N.W. 185, 187
(1909).
87. See note 83 supra. But see 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.79, at 817-18 (A.
J. Casner ed. 1952) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]:
Since those seven states [including Nebraska] . . . use words of in-
clusion in presenting the definition, it might be argued that the defi-
nitions are not exclusive, so that a person within the judicial
conception of what constitutes family headship might claim an ex-
emption even though he was not strictly within the terms of the stat-
ute. However, although the point does not seem to have been
expressly raised in appellate litigation, the general tenor of judicial
opinion appears to regard the definitions as exclusive.
Id.
88. For example, in Doman v. Fenton, 96 Neb. 94, 147 N.W. 209 (1914), a claimant
was held to qualify as the head of a family where she resided with and main-
tained the minor children of her deceased sister-in-law, notwithstanding that
the pertinent language of the statutory definition extended only to a claimant
residing with "'the minor child of a deceased brother or sister."' Id. at 97, 147
N.W. at 210. See also First Nat'l Bank v. McClanahan, 83 Neb. 706, 120 N.W.
185 (1909) (under former statute designating husband the head of the family
when the claimant was married, deserted wife was entitled to claim home-
stead exemption). Cf. In re Estate of Grassman, 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673
(1968) (under "liberal construction" of former statute providing a personal
property exemption in lieu of homestead only to heads of families, a wife
contributing to the support of her dependent husband qualified).
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will not further the policy of eliminating discrimination based on
sex from Nebraska laws. For this reason, if the homestead exemp-
tion is to be retained in Nebraska, a legislative response is the pref-
erable solution. The legislature should use this opportunity to
reconsider the family headship requirement with a view to its pos-
sible elimination, thereby extending the homestead exemption to
all individuals who otherwise qualify.89
The family headship requirement has not often been the sub-
ject of interpretative problems in Nebraska case law. One area of
uncertainty is whether a condition of dependency is required be-
tween the head of the family and family members residing with
him or her on the homestead.
Under the pre-1979 version of section 40-115 of the Homestead
Act, the dependency requirement varied according to the marital
status of the claimant and category of family member involved.9 0
When the claimant was married, former section 40-115(1) simply
provided that the husband was the head of the family;91 there was
no express statutory condition that family members be dependent
on him. However, when an unmarried claimant attempted to qual-
ify as the head of a family under former section 40-115(2), there
was an express dependency requirement delimited according to
whether the family member residing with the claimant had at-
tained the age of majority.92
Although Professor Foster has stated that "the head of the fam-
89. A number of states have recently abandoned the family headship require-
ment and now extend the homestead exemption to single persons without
dependents. See 2A R. PowELL & P. RoHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
263[1], at 406.7 (1979); 1 A.L.P., supra note 87, § 5.79, at 815-16; Haskins, supra
note 66, at 1293. For a discussion of Texas law extending the homestead ex-
emption to single adult persons, see Note, Effects of Extending the Homestead
Exemption to Single Adults, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 658 (1974). Elimination of the
family headship requirement will not, however, solve all problems associated
with the homestead exemption. The Unicameral should re-examine the pol-
icy of the homestead exemption more generally with a view to its possible
repeal and replacement. See notes 194-211 & accompanying text infra.
90. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-115(1) (Reissue 1978) (repealed 1979) with id.
§ 40-115(2) (repealed 1979).
91. Id. § 40-115(1) (repealed 1979) provided that the phrase head of a family in-
cluded "[t]he husband, when the claimant is a married person." This provi-
sion has been eliminated from the present version of § 40-115, and the
substative effect of this change on the homestead exemption is a matter of
great uncertainty. See notes 83-89 & accompanying text supra.
92. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-115(2) (Reissue 1978) (repealed 1979) provides that the
claimant must reside on the homestead premises with, and provide "care and
maintenance" for, one or more of the designated relatives in order to qualify
as the head of a family. Moreover, when the relative was "an unmarried sis-
ter" or any other relative who had "attained the age of majority," former § 40-
115(2) (e) added the requirement that the relative must be "unable to take
care of or support [himself or herself]." Id. § 40-115(2) (e) (repealed 1979).
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ily must owe the members of the family or some of them the duty
of support ... [which] may be legal, as in [the] case of a wife or a
minor child, or ... moral, as in the case of a sister,"93 this conclu-
sion is too simplistic. The issue of dependency has not been fre-
quently litigated in Nebraska, and no Nebraska case has analyzed
the distinctions made by former section 40-115 with respect to the
dependency relationship required between the claimant and the
various categories of family members.94 However, in Hyde v.
Hyde,95 the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that when a
claimant attempts to establish head of family status based upon
his relationship with an adult daughter, he must show not only
that his daughter resides with him on the homestead, but also that
she is "unable to take care of and support herself" and "under his
care and maintenance."9 6 The court stated that dependency is a
question of fact and suggested that the proper test is "actual and
necessary dependence by persons unable to earn a livelihood, who
have some natural claim."97 However, the court did not discuss
the nature of dependency required between a married claimant
and family members in order to establish family headship,98 or
when an unmarried claimant claims head of family status based
upon his relationship with a relative who has not attained the age
of majority.99
Both of these provisions remain substantially unchanged in the present ver-
sion of § 40-115. See notes 83-84 & accompanying text supra.
93. Foster, supra note 68, at 120.
94. For example, in Chamberlain Banking House v. Zutavern, 59 Neb. 623, 81
N.W. 858 (1900), the court simply stated that the evidence (not disclosed) was
sufficient to establish that certain of the children and grandchildren of the
homestead claimant, a widow, resided with her and were under her care and
maintenance.
95. 60 Neb. 502, 83 N.W. 673 (1900).
96. Id. at 505, 83 N.W. at 674. In Hyde, the claimant's daughter was 26 years old,
and although the evidence indicated that she was "somewhat eccentric and
below the average in intelligence," these handicaps did not prevent her from
obtaining "a second grade teacher's certificate in the county of her resi-
dence." Id. at 504, 83 N.W. at 674. She was also a somewhat proficient stenog-
rapher. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's
conclusion that the daughter was not dependent on her father for support.
97. Id. at 505, 83 N.W. at 674.
98. For example, it is unclear whether former § 40-115 required a married claim-
ant to show that his family was actually dependent upon him for support. Of
course, under Nebraska law the husband has a legal obligation to support his
wife and minor children. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-705 to -706 (Reissue 1979).
This problem is compounded under the present version of § 40-115, be-
cause the effect of the 1979 amendatory legislation has been to create a state
of total uncertainty as to the nature of the family headship requirement with
respect to married claimants. See notes 83-89 & accompanying text supra.
99. For example, must an unmarried claimant residing with a minor brother or
sister show both actual dependency and the inability of such brother or sister
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One final problem concerning the head of family requirement in
Nebraska is whether family headship, once acquired, may be lost
by the death or independence of members of the family. Suppose,
for example, that the homestead claimant is a former family head
who now resides alone upon the homestead tract. Is such claimant
eligible for the homestead exemption notwithstanding that he no
longer appears to qualify as the head of a family? Several deci-
sions of the Nebraska Supreme Court have answered this question
in the affirmative. 100
For example, in Palmer v. Sawyer,I0 1 an action to enjoin an exe-
cution sale of a tract of land occupied by the plaintiff, at the time
plaintiff purchased and moved onto the property he was a widower
and had three minor children living with him. Subsequently, one
of the children died, and the others attained majority and left
home.102 Thus, although plaintiff had been the head of the family
at the time the lands were purchased, he was living alone with no
dependent relatives under his care when the judgment creditor
brought suit.1 0 3 Noting that the Homestead Act does not expressly
limit the right to claim the homestead exemption "to the time dur-
ing which the premises are occupied by the dependent members of
the family jointly with the owner," the court adopted a liberal con-
struction of the family headship requirement and held that "When
a homestead is once acquired, the right to the continuous enjoy-
ment of it can only be defeated by the voluntary act of the claim-
ant."104 This interpretation of the family headship requirement
to support himself or herself as in Hyde? Or will actual dependency, without
more, suffice? Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-115(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) with
id. § 40-115(5). See generally 1 A.L.P., supra note 87, § 5.79, at 818-19.
100. See, e.g., Federal Credit Co. v. Reynolds, 132 Neb. 495, 272 N.W. 397 (1937);
Dorrington v. Myers, 11 Neb. 388, 9 N.W. 555 (1881); Foster, supra note 68, at
120-21. See generally 1 A.L.P., supra note 87, §§ 5.108-.111, at 876-84. In Dough-
erty v. White, 112 Neb. 675, 200 N.W. 884 (1924), the court stated the rule as
follows:
The law is settled that, where a husband and wife reside upon a
homestead and the wife dies, the homestead character of the land
continues and the surviving husband, although he may have no chil-
dren or dependents residing with him, may still retain the homestead
as such. The same rule obtains where the marriage relation has been
dissolved by decree of court.
Id. at 678, 200 N.W. at 885-86 (citations omitted).
101. 74 Neb. 108, 103 N.W. 1088 (1905).
102. Id. at 109, 103 N.W. at 1089.
103. The court stated that the question to be determined was "whether or not a
homestead once acquired by the head of a family can be divested by any act
other than the voluntary alienation, abandonment or waiver of the right by
the party entitled to the exemption." Id. at 110, 103 N.W. at 1089.
104. Id. at 116, 103 N.W. at 1091. Section 40-101 defines the homestead as "the
dwelling house in which the claimant resides, its appurtenances, and the land
on which the same is situated .... " NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp.
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accords with the court's apparent view that the purpose of the
homestead exemption is to extend protection "to the head of the
family as well as to the dependent members."105 However, it is dif-
ficult to rationalize this interpretation of homestead policy with
the denial of the homestead exemption to unmarried persons with-
out dependents, who, in at least some cases, are similarly situated
to deposed family heads such as the plaintiff in Palmer.0 6
2. Ownership Requirement
With one exception, 0 7 the homestead claimant is also required
to be the owner of a present possessory interest in the homestead
property. This requirement has two facets: (i) the property inter-
est required to support the homestead exemption; and (ii) the type
of property which may be claimed as a homestead.108
The Nebraska Homestead Act does not specify the nature of the
property interest which must be owned by the claimant in order to
qualify for the exemption. 0 9 However, numerous Nebraska cases
1980) (emphasis added). However, § 40-115 defines "head of a family" as
"every person who has residing on the premises with him or her, and under
his or her care and maintenance" any member of certain designated classes
of relatives. Id. § 40-115. This language, which could be interpreted as impos-
ing a continuous family headship requirement on the homestead claimant,
appears to have been overlooked or disregarded by the Palmer court. See
also Id. § 40-105 (Reissue 1978).
105. 74 Neb. at 114, 103 N.W. at 1091. See also Foster, supra note 68, at 112-13. But
see Winter v. Winter, 95 Neb. 335, 340-41, 145 N.W. 709, 712 (1914) (object of
former statute providing a personal property exemption in lieu of homestead
only to "heads of families" was "the protection of the family, and not the hus-
band"); Stout v. Rapp, 17 Neb. 462, 469, 23 N.W. 364, 368 (1885) ("the purpose
of ... the homestead exemption... [is] not.., so much for the benefit of
... the head of the family as for the family itself"); 1 A.LP., supra note 87,
§ 5.79, at 815 ("homestead statutes are generally regarded as justifiable only
in terms of the state's interest in preserving a home to a family, rather than in
terms of conferring a benefit on an individual property owner").
106. See notes 204-11 & accompanying text infra.
107. If the claimant is a married man, the homestead may be selected from his
separate property or, if his wife consents, from her separate property. In all
other cases, the homestead must be selected from the property of the claim-
ant. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-102 (Reissue 1978). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Mc-
Clanahan, 83 Neb. 706, 120 N.W. 185 (1909) (under former statute designating
husband as the head of the family, a deserted wife was entitled to claim the
homestead exemption from her husband's undivided interest in jointly
owned property). See generally Foster, supra note 68, at 121-28.
108. See In re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Neb. 1951).
109. See Foster, supra note 68, at 121. Section 40-101 of the Homestead Act pro-
vides that the homestead exemption is to consist of property "selected by the
owner thereof." NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Section 40-102
refers to the "property" of the claimant or the claimant's spouse without any
designation of the nature of the requisite estate in the homestead property.
Id. § 40-102 (Reissue 1978).
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have bridged this gap and, as a result, the ownership requirement
is not particularly controversial or problematical.
The homestead exemption is not limited to property held in fee
simple" 0 or to legal interests in the homestead."' A life estate" 2
or leasehold interest" 3 in the homestead tract is sufficient, as is
"any estate or interest in lands which give [sic] the right of occu-
pancy or possession... if coupled with requisite occupancy."" 4
In general, the key to the ownership requirement is the claim-
ant's present right to possession of the homestead." 5 Thus, future
interests, such as a remainder following a life estate, are not pro-
tected by the Homestead Act.116 Moreover, even certain present
110. Giles v. Miller, 36 Neb. 346, 54 N.W. 551 (1893). In Giles, the court stated that
in interpreting the ownership requirement a "liberal rule of construction"
should be applied in furtherance of the policy of the Homestead Act "to pro-
tect the debtor and his family in a home from forced sale on execution or
attachment." Id. at 349, 54 N.W. at 552. See generally Haskins, supra note 66,
at 1295-96; Vukowich, supra note 66, at 798-99.
111. '"The ownership need not be of an estate in fee-simple, but the owner of the
equitable title occupying under a contract of purchase may claim the exemp-
tion of the statute." Giles v. Miller, 36 Neb. 346, 349, 54 N.W. 551, 552 (1893).
See Alston v. Alston, 106 Neb. 623, 184 N.W. 82 (1921); Doman v. Fenton, 96
Neb. 94, 147 N.W. 209 (1914); Rawles v. Reichenbach, 65 Neb. 29, 90 N.W. 943
(1902); State v. Townsend, 17 Neb. 530,23 N.W. 509 (1885). See generally Has-
kins, supra note 66, at 1295. But see Corn Belt Products Co. v. Mullins, 172
Neb. 561, 570, 110 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1961) (purchaser under real estate contract
does not have any homestead right "as against the enforcement of the consid-
eration provided for in that contract"). The Corn Belt Products case has been
cited for the proposition that the homestead right does not attach to the inter-
est acquired under a contract to purchase real property. 2A R. POWELL & P.
RoHAN, supra note 89, 263 [3], at 406.12(2) n. 4.
112. Downing v. Hartshorn, 69 Neb. 364, 95 N.W. 801 (1903).
113. See notes 117-18 & accompanying text infra.
114. Giles v. Miller, 36 Neb. 346, 349, 54 N.W. 551, 552 (1893).
115. See Comment, supra note 66, at 1032.
116. In Fisher v. Kellogg, 128 Neb. 248, 258 N.W. 404 (1935), the plaintiff sought to
cancel a sheriff's deed transferring his remainder interest in 160 acres of land
to the defendant, the purchaser at an execution sale. At the time of the
forced sale, plaintiff resided on the property as a tenant pursuant to an oral
year-to-year lease with his mother, the holder of the life estate. The court
held that plaintiff's estate in remainder was not exempt under the Home-
stead Act, because it did not entitle plaintiff to immediate occupancy. In ex-
plaining its decision, the court noted that plaintiff's right to possession of the
property was pursuant to his lease, not his remainder, and that this posses-
sion "was in no wise disturbed by the sale of the remainder." Id. at 253, 258
N.W. at 406. See generally 1 A.LP., supra note 87, § 5.81, at 823-24; Haskins,
supra note 66, at 1295; Vukowich, supra note 66, at 798; Comment, supra note
66, at 1032 n.73. It is debatable whether or not the decision in Fisher as to the
scope of the homestead exemption is in accordance with the policy of the
Homestead Act. One leading authority has commented as follows:
The question of claiming a homestead in a future interest has
been an especially troublesome one. With an occasional exception,
the statutes are so worded as not to preclude allowance of homestead
1981]
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possessory interests of an insubstantial nature, such as the inter-
est of a tenant at will, do not satisfy the ownership requirement. 1 7
However, it has been held that a tenant under an oral month-to-
month lease of space in a house trailer court has a sufficient inter-
in such an interest. The courts, however, have recognized that the
homestead laws contemplate the protection of an interest in land
which is capable of use as a home, and it is probably the general rule
that a homestead may not be claimed in a future interest, even when
the remainderman is in possession under a lease from the life tenant
or otherwise. Some cases, however, have held that when the claim-
ant is presently in possession, a homestead claim may be asserted in
the remainder interest, which will be protected from sale on execu-
tion. Since this question involves the fundamental policy of the
homestead law-the extent of the statute's protection-it is one
which calls for some legislative pronouncement. When property is
exempted from execution, there must be some clear justification for
doing so. A remainder interest can well be withdrawn from the pro-
tection of the homestead laws on the ground that it is not immedi-
ately capable of use for a home. On the other hand, the fact that it
may be so used in the future might justify bringing it within the
scope of the statute. One attitude or the other should be taken by the
legislatures, and the question should not be made to turn on the fact
of whether or not the remainderman is in possession, under a lease
or otherwise.
1 A.L.P., supra note 87, § 5.81, at 823-24 (footnotes omitted). However, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court appears to have taken the position in Fisher that the
homestead policy of protecting the debtor and his dependents in the posses-
sion of the family home is not hindered by denying homestead status to fu-
ture interests, because such interests do not entitle holders thereof to
present possession of the property.
117. See Rank v. Garvey, 66 Neb. 767, 92 N.W. 1025 (1902), affid on rehearing, 66
Neb. 767, 99 N.W. 666 (1904); Howard v. Raymers, 64 Neb. 213, 89 N.W. 1004
(1902). According to Professor Foster, these cases are correctly decided be-
cause a tenant at will has "no assignable interest or interest subject to sale on
execution by creditors." Foster, supra note 68, at 122. However, in certain
situations, this conclusion may be at odds with the homestead policy of pro-
tecting the family home from forced sale. For example, the homestead claim-
ant in Howard resided with his wife in the home of his parents, which was
situated on land adjoining the claimant's 80 acre farm. This living arrange-
ment, as characterized by the court, was pursuant to a "a mutual arrange-
ment made for the convenience of the parties, and terminable at the will of
either." Id. at 215, 89 N.W. at 1005. The court held that claimant's 80 acre tract
was not subject to the homestead exemption, because "if he had no home-
stead interest in the land on which he lived, no such homestead right would
extend to his own property, which adjoined that on which he lived." Id. at
215,89 N.W. at 1005. To the extent that this decision can be read as turning on
whether or not claimant's right to occupy his parent's adjoining land was ter-
minable at will, it is difficult to justify in terms of homestead policy. Claim-
ant's ownership of the 80 acre tract was a substantial interest, and its
homestead status should have been determined in light of the purpose of the
homestead exemption and not by whether claimant's living arrangements
with respect to the adjoining property created a tenancy at will or a periodic
tenancy. See also notes 118-20 & accompanying text infra.
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est in land to support his claim for a homestead exemption.118 In
In re Foley,"i9 the bankrupt claimed a homestead exemption in a
"glider house trailer" which was located upon space in a trailer
court pursuant to an oral month-to-month land lease. The court
distinguished earlier cases denying homestead exemptions to
claimants who were tenants at will,120 and held that a tenant from
month-to-month has a sufficient property interest to support his
claim for a homestead exemption.
Although Foley was decided correctly and in accordance with
the purpose of the homestead exemption, the distinction it draws
between tenancies at will and periodic tenancies should not be fol-
lowed. Where, as in Foley, the homestead claimant has a substan-
tial property interest in a house trailer located on leased space, the
availability of the homestead exemption should be determined in
light of the policy of the Homestead Act and not by drawing fine
distinctions with respect to the nature of the claimant's leasehold
interest in the ground upon which the trailer is situated. Under
such a policy analysis, the question would be whether the claimed
exemption furthered the legislative goal of protecting the family
home. For example, when a vacationing claimant parks his recrea-
tional vehicle on leased space in a campground, the homestead ex-
emption generally should not be available, without regard to the
nature of the tenancy created by the rental agreement. However,
when the claimant locates his permanent house trailer on the land
of another, homestead policy is furthered by sheltering the trailer
from the claims of his creditors, again, without regard to the nature
of the tenancy created by the land lease.
Although some states apparently continue to follow early cases
denying homestead protection to concurrently owned property,
the general rule today is that the debtor's undivided interest in
property may be claimed as his homestead.121 The Nebraska deci-
sions on this question follow the general rule and hold that the
homestead exemption may be claimed in lands held in joint ten-
ancy or tenancy in common.12 2 The decision to treat undivided in-
118. In re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843 (D. Neb. 1951).
119. Id.
120. See note 117 & accompanying text supra.
121. See 1 A.L.P., supra note 87, § 5.81, at 822-23; Haskins, supra note 66, at 1295-96.
122. See, e.g. Edgerton v. Hamilton, 150 Neb. 821, 36 N.W.2d 258 (1949); J.H. Mel-
ville Lumber Co. v. Maroney, 145 Neb. 374, 16 N.W.2d 527 (1944); Doman v.
Fenton, 96 Neb. 94, 147 N.W. 209 (1914); First Nat'l Bank v. McClanahan, 83
Neb. 706, 120 N.W. 185 (1909). It could be argued that section 40-102 of the
Nebraska Homestead Act, which provides that the homestead of a married
claimant may be selected from the "separate property" of the husband or
wife, implies that jointly owned property may not be claimed as the home-
stead. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-102 (Reissue 1978). However, this contention was
rejected by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Edgerton, which held that § 40-
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terests in real property as eligible for the homestead exemption is
in line with the policy of protecting the debtor and his family in the
possession of their home. However, it also raises certain concep-
tual difficulties. For example, if each of two cotenants resides on
the commonly owned homestead property with his or her family,
may each cotenant claim a homestead in the property? If not, then
who may claim the homestead?
In Giles v. Miller,123 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that "an
undivided interest in real estate, accompanied by exclusive occu-
pancy, will support the homestead claim."124 Although the Giles
court did not clarify the meaning of "exclusive occupancy," it is
clear that when the head of the family owns the homestead prop-
erty concurrently with his or her spouse or dependent family
members, their residence with him on the property does not pre-
clude the homestead claim.125 Moreover, there is no requirement
that the entire homestead must be occupied by the claimant and
his family to the exclusion of everyone else.126
Perhaps the exclusive occupancy rule is nothing more than a
corollary of another rule, applicable more generally to the home-
stead exemption, which prescribes " 'that a homestead cannot be
occupied jointly by two families so that both will have homesteads
therein.' "127 In Luenenborg v. Luenenborg,128 the owner of a 160-
acre farm lived on the northwest corner of the property and leased
premises on the northeast part of the tract to one of his sons. The
son testified that "while he lived in the old set of improvements on
the northeast corner of this 160-acre tract, and had farmed the land
as his father's renter, . . . his father retained entire control over
102 refers to the separate property of husband and wife "in the sense of own-
ership in either the one or the other and not in the sense of the character of
the title by which the ownership was acquired." 150 Neb. at 827, 36 N.W.2d at
261.
123. 36 Neb. 346, 54 N.W. 551 (1893).
124. Id. at 349, 54 N.W. at 552 (emphasis added). This language has been quoted
with approval in numerous subsequent decisions. See, e.g. J.H. Melville
Lumber Co. v. Maroney, 145 Neb. 374, 379, 16 N.W.2d 527, 529 (1944); Connor v.
McDonald, 120 Neb. 503, 506, 233 N.W. 894, 896 (1931).
125. See Connor v. McDonald, 120 Neb. 503, 233 N.W. 894 (1931) (husband and wife
each owned an undivided one-half interest in jointly occupied homestead);
Doman v. Fenton, 96 Neb. 94, 147 N.W. 209 (1914) (head of family resided on
homestead with dependent cotenants); First Nat'l Bank v. McClanahan, 83
Neb. 706, 120 N.W. 185 (1909) (prior to the husband's desertion of his wife,
they had jointly occupied the homestead as tenants in common).
126. See notes 167-78 & accompanying text infra.
127. Luenenborg v. Luenenborg, 128 Neb. 624, 630, 259 N.W. 649, 652 (1935). For a
general discussion of the homestead occupancy requirement, see notes 148-85
& accompanying text infra.
128. 128 Neb. 624, 259 N.W. 649 (1935).
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the land."129 The court held that the father had a homestead right
in the entire 160-acre farm and, by implication, that his son had no
homestead right in the property "although ... [the son] farmed
the same [and] occupied with his family another set of buildings
thereon."130
Still unresolved, however, is the locus of homestead rights in
the relatively rare situation occurring when unrelated cotenants si-
multaneously reside with their respective families on, and jointly
control, the common property.'31
The second facet of the ownership requirement concerns the
type of property which qualifies for the homestead exemption.
Section 40-101 of the Nebraska Homestead Act defines the home-
stead as "the dwelling house in which the claimant resides, its ap-
purtenances, and the land on which the same is situated...."132
The homestead is further limited to 160 acres of land, in the case of
a rural homestead,133 or "a quantity of contiguous land not exceed-
ing two lots" in the case of an urban homestead. 3 4 In either case,
the exempt amount of the homestead may not exceed $6,500.135
The Nebraska decisions have taken a liberal view of the type of
improvements which satisfy the "dwelling house" requirement. A
129. Id. at 630, 259 N.W. at 652.
130. Id. at 631, 259 N.W. at 653.
131. Professor Foster noted that: "It is true that a homestead cannot be occupied
jointly by two families so that both will have homesteads therein. Also, it is
true that if a tenant in common claims a homestead, he must occupy the
property to the exclusion of his co-tenants." Foster, supra note 68, at 130.
Although Professor Foster's conclusion follows logically from the cases dis-
cussed above, no Nebraska case has squarely held that neither cotenant may
claim the homestead in a situation similar to that hypothesized in the text.
Moreover, the policy of the Homestead Act would appear to be better served
by protecting both occupying cotenants (and their respective families) in the
possession of their homes. See S. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON HOMEsTEAD AND
EXEMPMON LAwS, §§ 181, 188 (1878).
132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
133. Id. See In re Thomas' Estate, 178 Neb. 578, 585, 134 N.W.2d 237, 242 (1965)
("where two tracts of land [totaling 160 acres] corner with each other, they
are contiguous, and, when used as one farm, may be selected as a home-
stead"). See generally Foster, supra note 68, at 137-39.
134. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980). For decisions construing the lot
limitation, see First Trust Co. v. Bauer, 128 Neb. 725, 260 N.W. 194 (1935) (an
apartment house on a lot contiguous to the lot on which the claimant resided
with his family was not part of the homestead); Norfolk State Bank v.
Schwenk, 51 Neb. 146, 149, 70 N.W. 970, 971 (1897) (reference to urban "lots" in
Homestead Act is used "in its popular sense, and denotes the subdivisions of
a city or village as surveyed and platted"). See generally Foster, supra note
68, at 139.
135. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See notes 186-96 & accompanying
text infra.
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leading Nebraska case, Corey v. Schuster,136 stated the test as fol-
lows:
The law does not contemplate by the word "dwelling house" any particu-
lar kind of house. It may be a "brownstone front," all of which is occupied
for residence purposes, or it may be a building part of which is used for
banking or business purposes, or it may be a tent of cloth. All that the law
requires on the subject is that the homestead claimant and his family
should reside in this habitation or dwelling house, whatever be its charac-
ter, on the premises claimed as a homestead.
1 3 7
Property used by the claimant for mixed business and residential
purposes was impressed with homestead character in Corey. Sim-
ilarly, Nebraska cases have held that a duplex, 38 an apartment
house 39 and a hotel140 may constitute homestead property, so long
as the claimant occupies a portion thereof as the family resi-
dence.141
136. 44 Neb. 269, 62 N.W. 470 (1895). In Corey, the plaintiffs claimed a 1 1/2-story
frame building as their homestead. The frst floor of this structure was used
by Corey for commercial purposes, and the second floor served as the family
residence. The court held that the building and the lot upon which it was
situated constituted plaintiffs' homestead.
137. Id. at 275-76, 62 N.W. at 472. Professor Foster was critical of the breadth of
this language:
Conceding the correctness of the decision, the language of the judge
goes far beyond the necessities of the case. It may be that in the eyes
of the law an Arab's tent is his dwelling house, but it does not follow
that a circus tent should be considered such merely because the
owner slept under it. A federal court once held in a case arising in
Kansas that a brewery was a family dwelling house. On a parity of
reasoning if the brewer sang "Nearer my God to Thee" when brewing
his ale, the building would be a "house of religious worship." Where
the principal use to which a building is put is commercial or indus-
trial it is not ordinarily described as a "dwelling house." Fairness to
creditors and the public with whom the claimant deals would seem to
demand that the legal conception of a dwelling house should not dif-
fer substantially from the popular one. The homestead act was not
passed as a poor debtor's act or for the conservation of business
property. The test usually laid down by the authorities is that busi-
ness use must be incidental, not primary; otherwise, the building is
not a dwelling house. In corey v. Shuster [sic] and all other Ne-
braska cases involving mixed use, the results attained could be
reached under this test.
Foster, supra note 68, at 136 (footnotes ommitted).
138. Hawley v. Arnold, 137 Neb. 238, 288 N.W. 823 (1939).
139. Hess v. Eselin, 110 Neb. 590, 194 N.W. 469 (1923).
140. Foltz v. Maxwell, 100 Neb. 713, 161 N.W. 254 (1916).
141. Neither the Nebraska Homestead Act nor the case law thereunder expressly
extends the homestead exemption to condominiums or cooperative apart-
ments. However, both the policy of the homestead exemption and the liberal
interpretation generally afforded it by the courts point toward its application
to such property. If the homestead exemption is to be retained, legislative
action is necessary. To remove all traces of uncertainty, the Unicameral
should recognize contemporary housing patterns and adopt a modern statu-
tory definition of homestead property. See, e.g. CAi. Crv. CODE § 1237 (West
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Another difficult question is posed when the claimant attempts
to select a mobile home as the homestead. Some states expressly
include mobile homes within the protection of homestead legisla-
tion.142 However, where the statutes are silent, the cases are di-
vided over whether the homestead exemption applies to mobile
homes.14
3
In In re Foley,144 the bankrupt claimed an exemption under the
Nebraska Homestead Act in a glider house trailer located upon
leased space in a trailer court. Chief Judge Donahue, in a very
thoughtful opinion, concluded that a house trailer could qualify for
the Nebraska homestead exemption and suggested, without
clearly holding, that in order to so qualify the house trailer must be
permanently annexed to the realty upon which it is located.145 In
light of the policy of the homestead exemption, Foley states the
better reasoned view because denying the exemption to mobile
home dwellers would, no doubt, result often in the displacement of
such debtors and their families from their homes. 4 6 Moreover, as
a student author has noted, in states that place sparing dollar limi-
tations on the amount of the homestead exemption, granting
homestead status to mobile homes "might very well be the only
case in which the exemption actually saves the home of the claim-
ant."147
Supp. 1980); Uniform Exemption Act, § 4(c), 13 U.LA CrviL Pxoc. & REM.
LAWs 378 (1980). See generally Vukowich, supra note 66, at 798-99.
142. See, e.g., S.D. Com. LAWS ANN. § 43-31-1, -2 (Supp. 1979). The South Dakota
legislation defines "mobile home" as including "any vehicle without motive
power which can provide adequate, comfortable, all season quarters for the
purpose of making a residence thereof and which vehicle is larger than two
hundred forty square feet, measuring at the base thereot" Id. § 43-31-2.
143. See 1 A.L.P., supra note 87, § 5.80, at 820-21; Note, Debtors' Estates-Home-
stead-The Applicability of Homestead Exemption Laws to Mobile Homes, 7
WAKE FOREST L.REv. 520, 522-25 (1971).
144. 97 F. Supp. 843 (D. Neb. 1951).
145. Id. at 846-47. The court noted, however, "that courts should be very liberal in
determining that a sufficient attachment to the realty has occurred." Id. at
847.
146. See In re Williams, 24 F. Supp. 440 (D. Or. 1938) (dictum):
In a final analysis, the law was intended primarily to exempt the
place in which a man makes a home for himself and his family. It
would not be out of place in this age of migratory homes to construe
the old homestead law in the light of changing conditions and give
full effect to the true intent and purpose of the law.
Id. at 441. See also Haskins, supra note 66, at 1295 ("It would seem, however,
that if the function of homestead legislation is protection of the home, it
should be immaterial whether the home is a mere chattel or has achieved the
dignity of an estate in land or a chattel real." (footnote omitted)).
147. Note, supra note 143, at 522. See also notes 192-97 & accompanying text infra.
If the homestead exemption is to be retained in Nebraska, it should be
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3. Occupancy Requirement
Some states require homestead claimants to record a formal
declaration of homestead as a condition precedent to the establish-
ment of the homestead exemption.148 However, no such require-
ment is prescribed by Nebraska law149-a claimant who meets the
family headship and ownership requirements'5 0 and who occupies
the premises as a family home qualifies for the homestead exemp-
tion.15 1 When an execution for the enforcement of a judgment is
levied upon homestead property in nonbankruptcy proceedings,
the claimant may assert the homestead exemption "at any time
prior to confirmation of sale" by applying to the district court in the
county in which the property is located for a determination of
homestead.152 In bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor may claim the homestead by including it in the
list of exemptions filed pursuant to section 522(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act.15 3
Residential occupancy of the homestead by the debtor is an ex-
press statutory requirement. 5 4 Either actual or constructive occu-
pancy of the homestead will suffice, if accompanied by the
claimant's good faith intention to establish a home for his family
on the property.155 Thus, when the claimant occupies the would-
amended to provide expressly that mobile homes may be claimed as home-
stead property by debtors who are otherwise qualified for the exemption.
148. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1241, 1262-1265 (West 1954 & Supp. 1980); 2A R. POWELL
& P. RoHAN, supra note 89, 1 263[2], at 406.10; Haskins, supra note 66, at 1298.
149. Meyer v. Platt, 137 Neb. 714, 291 N.W. 86 (1940); Foltz v. Maxwell, 100 Neb. 713,
161 N.W. 254 (1916). See Foster, supra note 68, at 133-34.
150. See sections 11-A-1 to 2 of text supra.
151. "In its inception a homestead is a parcel of land on which the family resides,
and which is to them a home. It is constituted by the two acts of selection
and residence, in compliance with the terms of the law conferring it." Gal-
lagher v. Smiley, 28 Neb. 189, 194-95, 44 N.W. 187, 189 (1889).
152. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 40-105 to -108 (Reissue 1978). See 5 W. MOORE, NEBRAsKA
PRACTICE §§ 3710-3711 (1966).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (Supp. 111 1979). Until new bankruptcy rules are promul-
gated, the claim should be made in the schedules of property filed by the
debtor pursuant to existing Bankruptcy Rules 108 and 403(a). BANK.R R. 108,
403(a). See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2685 (1978), reprinted at 28
U.S.C. note prec. § 1471 (Supp. 1I 1979); 1 COLLIER, supra note 4, T 7.05[4]; 3
COLLIER, supra note 26, 1 522.26. The property claimed by the debtor as ex-
empt is exempt "[u]nless a party in interest objects." 11 U.S.C. § 522(1)
(Supp. 111 1979).
154. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Davis v. Kelly, 62 Neb. 642,
644, 87 N.W. 347, 347 (1901).
155. "The rule seems to be settled that the occupancy, to entitle the occupant to
homestead, must be coupled with an intention to remain thereon and to oc-
cupy and claim the land as a homestead." Rank v. Garvey, 66 Neb. 767, 781, 92
N.W. 1025, 1030 (1902), affid on rehearing, 66 Neb. 767, 99 N.W. 666 (1904). See
Foster, supra note 68, at 132-33.
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be homestead for the sole purpose of preventing its forced sale on
execution and without any intention of making it the permanent
family home, the homestead exemption will not be recognized.156
Similarly, in Rank v. Garvey,157 a tenant in possession of property
under a lease "permitting him to occupy the house on the premises
until such time as a sale [of the property] could be made, or until
the administrator desired possession" was found to be without the
requisite intention and, therefore, ineligible for the homestead ex-
emption.158
In accordance with its rule of liberal construction of the Home-
stead Act, the Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that homestead
claimants may establish the exemption by showing constructive
occupancy of the property.159 Constructive occupancy generally
requires "a present intention to occupy [the property] as a home-
stead as soon as circumstances reasonably permit, evidenced by
acts of preparation indicating such intention." 60 When the claim-
ant's intention to reside on unoccupied property is manifested by
physical acts on or directly relating to the property-repairs or im-
provements made on the property are good examples-the courts
should allow the homestead claim.'61 However, the policy consid-
erations blur when the claimant has not taken any physical action
directly connected with the would-be homestead. For example, in
156. See Clement, Bane & Co. v. Kopietz, 2 Neb. (Unoff.) 18, 95 N.W. 1126 (1901).
157. 66 Neb. 767, 92 N.W. 1025 (1902), affd on rehearing, 66 Neb. 767, 99 N.W. 666
(1904).
158. Id. at 781, 92 N.W. at 1030. To the extent that Rank can be read as holding that
a tenant at will does not have a sufficient interest in the property to support a
homestead claim, it is subject to criticism on grounds of policy. See note 117
supra. However, to the extent that the case rests on the claimant's lack of a
good faith intention to occupy the property as a home, it is good policy be-
cause it recognizes that the homestead exemption should not be applied to
deny creditors access to property except in furtherance of the purposes of the
Homestead Act.
159. Davis v. Kelly, 62 Neb. 642, 87 N.W. 347 (1901) (dictum); Hanlon v. Pollard, 17
Neb. 368, 22 N.W. 767 (1885).
160. Davis v. Kelly, 62 Neb. 642, 645, 87 N.W. 347, 347 (1901). See Filley v. Dickin-
son, 110 Neb. 356, 193 N.W. 914 (1923); Hair v. Davenport, 74 Neb. 117, 103 N.W.
1042 (1905); Hanlon v. Pollard, 17 Neb. 368, 22 N.W. 767 (1885).
161. See Hair v. Davenport, 74 Neb. 117, 103 N.W. 1042 (1905); Davis v. Kelly, 62
Neb. 642, 87 N.W. 347 (1901). But see Struempler v. Peterson, 190 Neb. 133,206
N.W.2d 629 (1973) (defendants purchased lot and began construction of house
with "announced intention" of moving thereon from existing homestead;
homestead not acquired in new property because existing homestead had not
been abandoned).
Of course, notwithstanding improvements and other physical acts con-
nected with the land, if other evidence indicates that the claimant does not
have the requisite intention to occupy the property as a home, the exemption
should be denied. See Filley v. Dickinson, 110 Neb. 356, 193 N.W. 914 (1923).
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the leading case of Hanlon v. Pollard,162 the plaintiff, a divorced
woman with children, was seeking an order enjoining an execution
sale of her claimed homestead. Plaintff had purchased a house lo-
cated on an eighty acre tract of land in October of 1879; however,
the property was then occupied by a tenant with an unexpired
lease, and plaintiff was unable to enter into actual occupancy until
February 23, 1880, the day on which the tenant vacated the prem-
ises and 14 days after the sheriff had levied on the property. Al-
though plaintiff apparently had not made any improvements or
taken any other physical action manifesting her intention to make
her home on the property, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
she was entitled to the homestead exemption because she had
"purchased the premises ... in good faith for the purpose and
with the manifest intention of making them her homestead."163
The liberal construction of the occupancy requirement in Han-
lon comports with homestead policy on the peculiar facts of that
case, because the plaintiff was able to explain satisfactorily her
failure to take possession of the homestead immediately upon
purchase and had entered into actual occupancy as soon as the
property was vacated by the former owner's tenant. However, the
occupancy requirement should not be disregarded frivolously by
the courts, because it has a significant function in homestead law,
serving both as the means of establishing the homestead character
of property and as a form of notice of homestead to potential pur-
chasers of the property'6 4 and creditors of the claimant.165 This
notice function is particularly important in Nebraska, since home-
162. 17 Neb. 368, 22 N.W. 767 (1885).
163. Id. at 373, 22 N.W. at 769. The court based its conclusion concerning plaintiffs
intended use of the property on "[t]he manner in which she obtained the
money to pay for the land, together with a consideration of her circumstances
and condition of life,... [and] the direct testimony to that effect." Id. at 370,
22 N.W. at 768.
164. Under § 40-104 the "homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or
encumbered unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 40-104 (Reissue 1978). An attempted conveyance of homestead property not
in compliance with § 40-104 is invalid. Struempler v. Peterson, 203 Neb. 173,
277 N.W.2d 691 (1979); McIntosh v. Borchers, 196 Neb. 109, 241 N.W.2d 534
(1976); Krueger v. Callies, 190 Neb. 376, 208 N.W.2d 685 (1973); Struempler v.
Peterson, 190 Neb. 133, 206 N.W.2d 629 (1973). See Foster, The Nebraska
Homestead-Part 2, 3 NEB. L. BuL. 353, 373-76 (1924).
165. It would be an unsafe rule to adopt to say that secret intentions
formed in the mind of the purchaser, without any physical act mani-
festing such intention, would impress upon a tract of land a home-
stead character, which would either exempt it from levy under legal
process or operate to defeat a sale made to other parties.
Hair v. Davenport, 74 Neb. 117, 121, 103 N.W. 1042, 1044 (1905). See Foster,
supra note 68, at 129-30.
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owners are not required to record a formal declaration of home-
stead to establish their entitlement to the exemption.166
Although it is sometimes stated that occupancy of the home-
stead must be exclusive,167 it is not true that the entire homestead
must be occupied by the claimant and his family to the exclusion
of everyone else. For example, Nebraska cases have held that a
duplex,168 an apartment house169 and a hotel7 0 may be claimed as
homestead property when the claimant and his family reside on
the premises. Analysis of the Nebraska joint occupancy cases dis-
closes that when there is a nexus between possession or use of a
portion of the claimed homestead by third parties and the claim-
ant's enjoyment of the property, it is likely that the court will find
that the claimant's homestead extends to the entire premises. For
example, in Guy v. Douns,'71 when a horse barn located on claim-
ant's homestead was leased to third parties, the sheriff proceeded
to levy a writ of execution upon "the twenty-two feet of the lot on
which the said barn stands."172 The Nebraska Supreme Court af-
firmed a final decree of the district court enjoining the forced sale
of the homestead and explained its holding as follows:
No one will doubt that a homestead... would be occupied as such, within
the meaning of the statute, by a residence thereon by the debtor and his
family in a house of the smallest dimensions, although the entire balance
of such land were suffered to go to waste or lie common. And why would it
be any the less so occupied if such balance were put to some useful pur-
pose? We can see no reason, even although such purpose might involve
the joint occupancy of other persons. It is neither within the letter or the
spirit of the statute that the occupancy of the homestead by the debtor
should be exclusive. He fulfils the terms of the law by continuing to oc-
cupy, and while he does so, he can do or suffer any other lawful thing in
reference to the premises not inconsistent with his said occupancy.
1 7 3
However, when the occupancy by third parties of a portion of
the claimed homestead is unconnected to the claimant's occu-
166. See note 149 & accompanying text supra.
167. See notes 123-26 & accompanying text supra; Foster, supra note 68, at 130-31.
168. Hawley v. Arnold, 137 Neb. 238, 288 N.W. 823 (1939) (duplex consisting of sep-
arate six room apartments; one of the apartments was leased to tenants and
had never been occupied by the claimant).
169. Hess v. Eselin, 110 Neb. 590, 194 N.W. 469 (1923) (single building consisting of
four apartments; claimant and his family resided in one of the apartments).
170. Foltz v. Maxwell, 100 Neb. 713, 161 N.W. 254 (1916) (husband and wife "occu-
pied the property and conducted a hotel therein").
171. 12 Neb. 532, 12 N.W. 8 (1882).
172. Id. at 533, 12 N.W. at 8.
173. Id. at 535-36, 12 N.W. at 9. Although Guy v. Downs was decided under previ-
ous Nebraska homestead legislation, its reasoning pertains equally to the
joint occupancy question arising under the present act. See also Luenenborg
v. Luenenborg, 128 Neb. 624, 259 N.W. 649 (1935). For a discussion of problems
arising from joint occupancy of homestead property by cotenants, see note
131 & accompanying text supra.
1981]
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pancy of the remainder of the tract, the homestead probably will
not include the property in the possession of the third parties.174
This distinction is illustrated by First Trust Company v. Bauer.175
In Bauer, the debtor owned two contiguous lots, numbered 5 and 6,
and lived with his family in one of several apartments contained in
a building located on lot 5. On lot 6 there was a separate building
containing several apartments "which were always rented to ten-
ants."' 76 The court held that the debtor's homestead did not in-
clude lot 6 and the apartment house located thereon.177 The line
drawn by the Nebraska cases is a sensible one and is faithful to the
purposes of the homestead exemption. Moreover, to the extent
that it apparently permits possible abuse of homestead legislation
by allowing debtors to claim a homestead in predominantly non-
owner occupied property (e.g., a high-rise apartment building in
which the owner resides in one of many apartments), the poten-
tial lroblem is checked by the dollar limitation on the amount of
the homestead exemption. 7 8
When a homestead exemption is selected from the separate
property of the wife of a married claimant, her required consent 179
to the selection will be presumed from evidence establishing that
the property was occupied by the family as its home.180 However,
when property is levied upon by creditors of a married man, and
his wife objects to selection of the homestead from her separate
interest in the property, there will be no presumption of con-
174. Compare First Trust Co. v. Bauer, 128 Neb. 725, 260 N.W. 194 (1935) with
Schroeder v. Ely, 161 Neb. 262, 73 N.W.2d 172 (1955) and Hess v. Eselin, 110
Neb. 590, 194 N.W. 469 (1923). See also Foster, supra note 68, at 130-32.
175. 128 Neb. 725, 260 N.W. 194 (1935).
176. Id. at 726, 260 N.W. at 194. The court stated that "[i]t does not appear that
there was any connection between the use of lot 5 and lot 6." Id.
177. Id. at 727-28, 260 N.W. at 195. The court noted that lot 6 would have been
included in the debtor's homestead had it been "a vacant lot and a part of the
grounds appurtenant to the dwelling [on lot 5]." Id. at 727, 260 N.W. at 195. In
contrast, in Schroeder v. Ely, 161 Neb. 262, 73 N.W.2d 172 (1955), the debtor's
property consisted of an 18 acre tract on which two buildings, a house in
which the claimant resided and a motel, were situated. The court held that
the debtor's homestead was composed of the entire 18 acre tract and noted
that the house and land upon which it was situated could not be segregated
from the motel and the remainder of the tract without material injury to "the
property as a whole." Id. at 266, 73 N.W.2d at 175. See also In re Thomas'
Estate, 178 Neb. 578, 584-85, 134 N.W.2d 237, 241-42 (1965).
178. See notes 186-93 & accompanying text infra.
179. "If the claimant be married, the homestead may be selected from the sepa-
rate property of the husband, or with the consent of the wife from her sepa-
rate propeerty." NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-102 (Reissue 1978).
180. See In re Nielsen's Estate, 135 Neb. 110, 280 N.W. 246 (1938); Hobson v. Huxta-
ble, 79 Neb. 334, 112 N.W. 658 (1907), vacated on other grounds, 79 Neb. 340, 116
N.W. 278 (1908); Foster, supra note 68, at 127-28.
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sent.181 Thus, in First National Bank v. McClanahan,182 plaintiffs,
judgment creditors of Andrew J. McClanahan, levied upon real
property owned by McClanahan and his wife, the defendant, as
tenants in common. This property had been occupied by the de-
fendant and her husband prior to his desertion of the family; there-
after, it was occupied by Mrs. McClanahan and her family.
Defendant sought to have the homestead exemption set off from
her husband's undivided one-half interest in the property. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that the defendant's interest in the
property should not be treated as part of the homestead, because
her consent to the selection of the homestead from her separate
property had not been given, and that the then applicable $2,000
homestead exemption should be set off from the undivided inter-
est of Mr. McClanahan.183
The decision in McClanahan disregarding the presumption of
selection is justified by the family protection policy of the Home-
stead Act and by the liberal construction accorded the homestead
exemption in support of that policy.184 Since the levying plaintiffs
were individual creditors of Mr. McClanahan, the maximum home-
stead exemption (and thus the maximum protection of the family)
was obtainable only by setting off his undivided interest in the
property as the homestead.185
4. Dollar Limitation
When enacted in 1879, the Nebraska Homestead Act contained
a $2,000 ceiling on the amount of the exemption. 8 6 This amount
was increased to $4,000 in 1973,187 and to its present level of $6,500
in 1980.188 However, many Nebraska debtors will not be immedi-
181. See Foster, supra note 68, at 127-28.
182. 83 Neb. 706, 120 N.W. 185 (1909).
183. Id. at 711-12, 120 N.W. at 186-87. The court stated:
[T]he homestead act ... authorizes the selection of the homestead
from the separate property of either the husband or wife, but from
the property of the wife only with her consent. In this case the wife
has not consented, and is strenuously objecting to the homestead be-
ing selected from her separate property.
Id. at 712, 120 N.W. at 187. See also Connor v. McDonald, 120 Neb. 503, 233
N.W. 894 (1931); Klamp v. Klamp, 58 Neb. 748, 79 N.W. 735 (1899). But see In re
Nielsen's Estate, 135 Neb. 110, 280 N.W. 246 (1938).
184. See 83 Neb. at 711, 120 N.W. at 187.
185. See Foster, supra note 68, at 127.
186. Act of Feb. 26, 1879, § 1, 1879 Neb. Laws 57 (current version at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
187. Act of Feb. 2, 1973, § 1, 1973 Neb. Laws 69, (current version at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
188. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, L.B. 940, § 3, 1980 Neb. Laws 1051 (codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980)). Although the maximum amount of the
homestead exemption has more than tripled since 1879, the present $6,500
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ately entitled to the full benefit of the 1980 increase, because deci-
sions interpreting the contracts clause 89 of the United States
Constitution' 9 0 and Nebraska case law interpreting exemption
statutes91 deny retroactive effect to laws increasing the amount of
exemptions. Thus, increased exemptions are generally not effec-
tive against obligations predating the increase.
The homestead of the claimant is exempt in its entirety if the
debtor's interest therein does not exceed the amount of the home-
stead exemption.192 However, if the debtor's interest in the home-
figure does not even approximate an amount which would keep pace with the
more than 100 years of inflation that has occurred since 1879. See U.S. Bu-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULi. No. 1790, HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS 1973, at 287 (Table 121); 103 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, May
1980, at 85 (Table 22). Thus, the homestead exemption is increasingly ineffec-
five as a means of protecting the family home from forced sale. See notes 194-
97 & accompanying text infra.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides in pertinent part: "No state shall...
pass any... law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ...." See also NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 16.
190. See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); Bank of Minden v.
Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877); Gunn v.
Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872). See generally Stern, State Exemption
Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor as a Medium for Appraising As-
pects of Bankruptcy Reform, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 70, 91-93 (1980); Comment,
The Contract Clause and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Application of
Exemption Statutes: A Reconsideration, 9 PAc. L.J. 889 (1978); Comment,
Contracts Clause Prevents Exemption Change, 1 STAN. L. REV. 350 (1949).
Several commentators have suggested that these cases should be reconsid-
ered in light of subsequent develpments in the interpretation of the contracts
clause by the Supreme Court. Countryman, supra note 7, at 727; Neustadter,
supra note 21, at 878-79; Comment, PAc. L.J., supra, at 889; Comment, STAN. L.
REV. supra, at 353-54; Comment, YALE LJ., supra note 12, at 1471-72. See In re
Curry, 5 B.R. 282, 292-93 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Echavarren, 2 B.R.
215 (Bankr. Ct. D. Idaho 1980); Wilkinson v. Carpenter, 277 Or. 557, 561 P.2d
607 (1977); Hooter v. Wilson, 273 So. 2d 516 (La. 1973).
191. See, e.g., Dewitt v. Wheeler & Wilson Sewing Machine Co., 17 Neb. 533, 23
N.W. 506 (1885); Dorrington v. Myers, 11 Neb. 388, 9 N.W. 555 (1881). See also
Foster, supra note 68, at 148. Recent bankruptcy cases denying retroactive
effect to increased exemptions include: Sturgeon v. Steele, 563 F.2d 1154 (4th
Cir. 1977); Swenor v. Robertson, 452 F.Supp. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re
Echavarren, 2 B.R. 215 (Bankr. Ct. D. Idaho 1980); and In re Pappas, 2 B.R. 138
(Bankr. Ct. C. D. Cal. 1980). But see In re Ageton, 6 B.R. 727 (Bankr. Ct. D.
Ariz. 1980) ( debtor allowed to claim increased homestead in effect on date of
filing petition in bankruptcy); In re Curry, 5 B.R. 282, 292 (Bankr. Ct. N.D.
Ohio 1980) (state statute increasing amount of exemption does not violate
contracts clause if the resulting "impairment of contract is both reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose").
192. If an interest in land less than the fee is sufficient to entitle a claim-
ant to the benefits of the provisions of the homestead act, and there
can be no doubt of it, it follows logically that the extent of a home-
stead is to be determined by the value of the claimant's interest in
the land, whatever it may be. In case a valid mortgage upon the
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stead exceeds the dollar limitation and the homestead cannot be
divided without material injury, the property will be sold under ex-
ecution and the debtor may exempt the proceeds of the sale in an
amount equal to the homestead exemption.193
5. Reconsideration of the Homestead Exemption
The Nebraska homestead exemption no longer serves its pri-
mary purpose of protecting the family home. Although the 1879
ceiling of $2,000 was apparently then adequate to exempt, in its en-
tirety, the family home of the average debtor,19 4 the current $6,500
maximum homestead exemption is inadequate to prevent a forced
sale of many, if not most, average family homes. 9 5 This is particu-
homestead remains unpaid, the morgagor is entitled, as against sub-
sequent judgment creditors, to the statutory exemption of $2,000 over
and above the amount of the mortgage lien.
Hoy v. Anderson, 39 Neb. 386, 389, 58 N.W. 125, 126 (1894) (claimant's 160 acre
tract, valued at $2,800 and subject to a $1,200 mortgage, was exempt from exe-
cution under $2,000 homestead exemption then in effect). See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 40-116 (Reissue 1978); J.L Melville Lumber Co. v. Maroney, 145 Neb.
374, 16 N.W.2d 527 (1944); Hawley v. Arnold, 137 Neb. 238, 288 N.W. 823 (1939).
193. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 40-108, -110 to -113, -116 (Reissue 1978); Schroeder v.
Ely, 161 Neb. 262, 73 N.W.2d 172 (1955). When an indivisible homestead is sold
on execution, the proceeds paid to the claimant with respect to the home-
stead exemption are protected for a period of six months to the same extent
as homestead property. NEB.REv. STAT. § 40-113 (Reissue 1978). In addition,
§ 40-116 provides:
If the homestead be conveyed by the claimant, or sold for the sat-
isfaction of any lien mentioned in section 40-103 [mortgages and
mechanics', laborers', or vendors' liens upon the homestead prem-
ises], the proceeds of such sale, beyond the amount necessary to the
satisfaction of such lien, and not exceeding the amount of the home-
stead exemption, shall be entitled, for the period of six months there-
after, to the same protection against legal process and the voluntary
disposition of the claimant which the law gives to the homestead.
The sale and disposition of one homestead shall not be held to pre-
vent the selection or purchase of another, as provided in sections 40-
101 to 40-117.
Id. § 40-116.
194. The debtor's interest in the homestead was found not to be in excess of the
amount of the homestead exemption in numerous early Nebraska cases. See,
e.g., Radbruck v. First Nat'l Bank, 95 Neb. 288, 145 N.W. 715 (1914); Chamber-
lain Banking House v. Zutavern, 59 Neb. 623, 81 N.W. 858 (1900); Roberts v.
Robinson, 49 Neb. 717, 68 N.W. 1035 (1896); Hoy v. Anderson, 39 Neb. 386, 58
N.W. 125 (1894).
195. For example, if the debtor's equity in the homestead is 20%, a homestead
with a value in excess of $32,500 will not be protected from execution under
the current homestead ceiling. However, if the debtor's equity is 50%, a
homestead with a value in excess of $13,000 will not be protected. According
to statistics supplied to the author by the Nebraska Department of Economic
Development, the average selling price of single family homes in Lancaster
and Douglas counties for the year 1979 was, respectively, $47,191 and $42,239.
Letter from Steve Williams to Richard F. Duncan (July 15, 1980) (copy on file
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larly true with respect to older, more established debtors, who are
more likely to have built up greater equities in their homes than
are younger homeowners. 196
In effect, the homestead exemption is in danger of becoming a
cash exemption available only to owners of residential real prop-
erty.197 Therefore, the time is ripe for a reconsideration of the pol-
icy of the Nebraska homestead exemption. In responding to this
challenge, the Unicameral has at least four options.198 First, it may
choose to retain a fixed-amount homestead exemption with the ex-
pectation that legislative action will be taken to increase the limi-
tation from time to time to keep pace with inflation. However, even
with the best of intentions, it is unlikely that this course of action
will produce a homestead exemption in balance with constantly
changing economic conditions.199
Second, the legislature could amend the homestead act to elimi-
nate the dollar limitation and to provide for an unlimited home-
stead exemption subject only to rural and urban area
limitations.200 Although this scheme will effectuate the home-
stead goal of protecting the family home from forced sale (inflation
notwithstanding), it is unacceptable because in many cases it will
at Nebraska Law Review). According to the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the median property value of existing
FHA-insured single family homes in the State of Nebraska for the year 1978
was $29,354. FHA OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEv., FHA HOMES 1978: DATA FOR STATES AND SELECTED AREAS (Table 55).
This situation results in a dilemma for the Unicameral when faced with deter-
mining the appropriate level of the homestead ceiling. If the dollar limitation
is set too low, the homestead exemption will fail to achieve its primary pur-
pose of protecting the family home against the claims of creditors. See
Vukowich, supra note 66, at 806; Comment, YALE L.J., supra note 12, at 1466.
However, if the dollar limitation is set at a more realistic level, creditors may,
with some justification, perceive that they are being unfairly denied access to
substantial assets of their debtors. See Vukowich, supra note 66, at 807. Cf.
Meisner v. Hill, 92 Neb. 435, 442, 138 N.W. 583, 586 (1912) (purpose of dollar
limitation on homestead exemption is to protect creditors against "exces-
sively valuable" homesteads).
196. See Donnelly, supra note 1, at 308; note 195 supra.
197. See generally Lacy, supra note 28, at 693.
198. See generally Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time For Modernization, 34
IND. L.J. 355, 356-60 (1959).
199. See id. at 356, 365. In any case, setting the dollar limitation at a realistic level
may cause creditors of homestead claimants to be unfairly denied access to
substantial assets of their debtors. See note 195 supra.
200. See, e.g., TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 51; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 3833, 3835
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (rural homestead unlimited as to value). For an inter-
esting discussion of a case involving a Texas bankrupt who claimed a rural
homestead consisting of "nearly 200 acres of land, a 250 thousand dollar
house, and a 175 thousand dollar '"party barn" against creditors' claims total-
ing over $2,000,000, see Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to
the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 665 (1968).
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produce a homestead exemption that is far too generous to debtors
and, therefore, unfair to creditors.2O1
The third option is amendment of the homestead exemption to
increase the dollar amount to a more realistic level20 2 and to pro-
vide for its automatic adjustment periodically in accordance with
changes in the consumer price index or some other recognized in-
dicator of economic actiity.203 Finally, the legislature could repeal
the homestead exemption and replace it with an amended exemp-
tion in lieu of homestead applicable to all debtors and to both real
and personal property.
If the legislative consensus is that the policy of protecting the
homes of Nebraska debtors from forced sale continues to be so-
cially desirable, the third option should be exercised. Thus, the
legislature should immediately increase the amount of the home-
stead exemption to a realistic level and provide for its automatic
adjustment to account for the effect of inflation on the value of resi-
dential real property.
However, in formulating this policy the legislature should rec-
201. See Joslin, supra note 198, at 365; note 195 supra.
202. As previously noted, such an increase may unfairly impact on creditors of
homestead claimants. See note 195 supra.
203. Several scholars have suggested that exemption statutes should provide for
automatic adjustment of dollar limitations on the amount of exemptions to
reflect changes in economic conditions. See, e.g., Costa, supra note 17, at 69-
70; Joslin, supra note 198, at 365; Comment, YALE L.J., supra note 12, at 1507.
The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges addressed the problem in
section 1-105(a) of their proposed bankruptcy act:
The dollar amounts designated in this title shall be adjusted as pro-
vided in this section according to and to the extent of changes in the
Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Work-
ers: United States City Average, All Items, 1967 = 100, compiled by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor,
and hereafter referred to as the index. The index for December 197-
is the Reference Base Index. If the index is revised after December
197-, the adjustment pursuant to this section shall be calculated on
the basis of the revised index. If the index is superseded, the index
referred to in this secion is one represented by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics as reflecting most accurately the changes in the purchasing
power of the dollar for consumers.
H.R. 32, § 1-105(a), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1975). See H.R. 16643, § 1-105(a), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See also Uniform
Exemption Act, § 2, 13 U.L.A. Crvi Pxoc. & REM. LAWS 374-75 (1980). As
finally enacted, the Bankruptcy Reform Act does not provide for automatic
adjustment of fixed dollar amounts. However, § 104 of the Act does provide
that the Judicial Conference of the United States shall periodically recom-
mend to the President and Congress a "uniform percentage adjustment" of
dollar amounts. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. I1 1979). Presumably, these recom-
mendations will induce the Congress and the President to approve legislation
effecting the adjustments. See Neustadter, supra note 21, at 856.
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ognize that the Nebraska exemption scheme creates three classes
of debtors: (1) family heads who are homeowners; (2) residents of
rental property; and (3) single individuals without dependents.
Members of the first group, who are generally more affluent than
their counterparts in the second and third categories, 204 are enti-
tled to the homestead exemption, while members of the latter two
groups are limited to the less generous personal property exemp-
tion in lieu of homestead.205
When the homestead exemption was originally enacted in this
state, home ownership was the rule and renting was a relatively
uncommon exception.20 6 The homestead policy of protecting the
family home from execution developed perhaps in recognition of
the plight facing a nineteenth century pioneer family turned out of
its home by creditors and having no other place to go. However, in
contemporary society, families commonly reside in rental units,207
and this demographic evolution has prompted one commentator to
conclude that the "homestead exemption is now unnecessary and
undesirable" because "living in rental units presents a reasonable
alternative to home ownership."20 8
Thus, not only is the homestead exemption increasingly ineffec-
tual in achieving its primary purpose of protecting the family
home, but it is available only to those family heads who own
homes, a distinction which is increasingly difficult to justify in
204. Homeowners are generally more affluent than non-homeowners in terms of
income and net worth. See 1979 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 787 (Table
1385); Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 403, 473 n.199 (1973). The family income of families with a male head is
generally greater than the income of single individuals. See 1979 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 451 (Table 740).
205. See notes 212-39 & accompanying text infra. Commentators have called at-
tention to the unequal treatment existing between homeowners and non-
homeowners under state exemption laws. See, e.g. Drake, The Judges' Bank-
ruptcy Bill and the Commission's Bill: A Question of Access to the Judicial
Process, 26 MERCER L.REV. 1009, 1028 (1975); Joslin, supra note 198, at 365;
Shuchman, supra note 204, at 473 n.199; Ulrich, supra note 15, at 139. See also
HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361 (purpose of § 522 (d) (5) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act was to eliminate discrimination against the non-homeowner).
For a discussion of the federal wildcard or grubstake exemption created by
§ 522(d) (5) of the New Act, see notes 40-41 & accompanying text supra. But
see Vukowich, supra note 18, at 1463; Vukowich, supra note 66, at 831-32. For
a suggested legislative response which would eliminate this inequity from
Nebraska exemption law, see notes 209-11 & accompanying text infra.
206. See C. WRiGHT, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNtiED STATES 1022-23 (1941);
Vukowich, supra note 66, at 805.
207. In 1977, approximately 35% of all occupied housing units were occupied by
renters. 1979 STATSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 782 (Table 1377).
208. Vukowich, supra note 66, at 805. This conclusion is probably more supporta-
ble with respect to urban areas than to rural areas. See Comment, supra note
66, at 1040-41.
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modern society. Fairness to creditors and all classes of debtors re-
quires a complete overhaul of Nebraska exemption policy. The
most appropriate legislative response to the situation is the fourth
option discussed above-repeal of the homestead exemption and
amendment of the exemption in lieu of homestead 209 to make it
applicable to all debtors and to real as well as personal property.2 10
Such a policy is fair both to debtors and creditors and would elimi-
nate distinctions based upon family headship and homeowner sta-
tus without sacrificing any realistic goal of the present homestead
exemption.21 '
209. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See generally notes 212-39 &
accompanying text infra.
210. The present version of the exemption in lieu of homestead provides:
All persons who have neither lands, town lots, or houses subject to
exemptions as a homestead, under the laws of this state, shall have
exempt from forced sale on execution the sum of twenty-five hun-
dred dollars in personal property, except wages. The provisions of
this section shall not, in any manner, apply to the exemption of
wages, that subject being fully provided for by section 25-1558.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980). In order to achieve the goals
discussed in the text, the author proposes that § 25-1552 should be amended
to read:
All persons shall have exempt from forced sale on execution the sum
of twenty-five hundred dollars in real or personal property, except
wages. The provisions of this section shall not, in any manner, apply
to the exemption of wages, that subject being fully provided for by
section 25-1558.
See also id. §§ 30-2322, -2325 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Of course, the Unicameral
should also consider whether any increase in the amount of the exemption is
desirable under the circumstances and whether such amount should be in-
dexed to reflect changes in the cost of living. See note 203 & accompanying
text supra. Finally, consideration should be given to whether the amount of
the exemption should be further increased in the case of debtors who support
one or more dependents. See Ulrich, supra note 41, at 135, 141, 155.
211. One criticism of a grubstake exemption, such as that proposed by this article,
is that "highly favored property, such as a homestead ... receives the same
treatment ... as less favored property such as country club memberships,
ski cabins, gambling casino chips, wine cellars, and yachts." Hughes, supra
note 5, at 1031. See also Kennedy, supra note 16, at 449; Comment, YALE LJ.,
supra note 12, at 1507-10. However, this same criticism can be made with
respect to the practical effect of the present homestead exemption, which is
in danger of becoming a cash exemption available only to homeowners. See
notes 194-97 & accompanying text supra. Moreover, since the author's pro-
posed amendment to § 25-1552 merely expands the persons and types of prop-
erty covered by the provision and does not create a new type of exemption, it
should not cause any new questions of policy or procedure to arise. Finally, it
is unlikely that many debtors will exempt yachts and casino chips in prefer-
ence to more essential types of property.
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B. Other Nebraska Exemptions
1. The Exemption In Lieu of Homestead and the Specific
Exemption
The two primary personal property exemption statutes in Ne-
braska are the $2,500 exemption in lieu of homestead2 12 and the
exemption of specific categories of the debtor's personalty.2 13 Like
the homestead exemption, the exemption in lieu of homestead and
the specific exemption are rooted in the policy of family protec-
tion.214 Accordingly, until 1977 both exemptions were available
only to family heads.2 15 However, in 1977 the family headship re-
quirement was deleted by the Unicameral 21 6 in order to eliminate
discrimination against non-heads of families 2 17 and in recognition
212. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Both the present version and a
suggested revision of § 25-1552 are set forth in full at note 210 supra.
213. Section 25-1556 provides:
No property hereinafter mentioned shall be liable to attachment, ex-
ecution or sale on any final process issued from any court in this
state, against any person being a resident of this state: (1) The im-
mediate personal possessions of the debtor and his family; and (2)
all necessary wearing apparel of the debtor and his family; all kitch-
en utensils and household furniture, to be selected by the debtor, not
exceeding in value fifteen hundred dollars; all equipment or tools
used by the debtor or his family for their own support not exceeding
fifteen hundred dollars in value; the provisions for the debtor and his
family necessary for six months' support, either provided or growing,
or both; and fuel necessary for six months. All of the articles herein-
before intended to be exempt shall be chosen by the debtor, his
agent, clerk or legal representative, as the case may be.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1979). This exemption will be referred to
in this article as the "specific personal property exemption" or the "specific
exemption."
214. See In re Estate of Grassman, 183 Neb. 147, 152, 158 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1968);
Winter v. Winter, 95 Neb. 335, 340-41, 145 N.W. 709, 712 (1914); Frazier v. Syas,
10 Neb. 115, 118, 4 N.W. 934, 935 (1880).
215. Act of Jan. 2, 1973, LB. 16, §§ 1-2, 1973 Neb. Laws 70 (repealed 1977) (previ-
ously codified at NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1552, -1556 (Reissue 1975)) (repealed
1977).
216. Act of Mar. 5, 1977, LB. 60, §§ 1-2, 1977 Neb. Laws 543 (current version codified
at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1552, -1556 (Reissue 1978 & Cum Supp. 1980)).
217. Senator Fowler, who introduced the bill, discussed its policy at a public hear-
ing before the Judiciary Committee of the Unicameral:
Now, what has come to light in some recent cases ... is that the
way our current exemption statute is written it covers people who
are only heads of families. Legally what that means then, if you are a
single person, you are a widow or widower living alone, you have no
protection.... I think this is somewhat discriminatory, I think that
it is against the initial concept of exemptions and I would hope that
we could clarify or change this language so that exemptions would
apply to single people or people who are not heads of families as well
as those who are.
Public Hearing on L.B. 60 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the Nebraska
Unicameral, Jan. 19, 1977, 85th Legis., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
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of a modern exemption policy concerned not only with protection
of the family, but also with providing a minimum level of subsis-
tence to individual debtors in order to prevent them from becom-
ing "ward[s] of the state and county."2 18
Although under present law the exemption in lieu of home-
stead and the specific personal property exemption appear to ap-
ply to all otherwise qualified persons regardless of marital or
family status, there is some uncertainty concerning application of
the exemptions in the case of a married couple. The straightfor-
ward and better reading of the provisions would allow each spouse
to claim the exemptions, just as each single individual may do.
However, the legislative history of L.B. 60, the 1977 bill that elimi-
nated the family headship requirement, indicates that the bill was
not intended to change pre-existing law as applied to married per-
sons. 2 19 Accordingly, it can be argued that each family is entitled
to only one $2,500 exemption in lieu of homestead and only one set
of specific personal property exemptions and that the effect of L.B.
60 was simply to grant the exemptions to single individuals who
are not dependent members of a family.22 0 The Nebraska courts
should disregard the confusing and inconclusive legislative history
of L.B.60 and give effect to the unambiguous language of the act
granting the exemptions to every otherwise qualified person with-
out regard to marital or family status.
The exemption in lieu of homestead was enacted, at least in
part, "for the purpose of equalizing somewhat the exemption be-
tween those who [own] lands and those who [do] not."2 21 Thus, it
is available to all residents2 22 of Nebraska "who have neither
lands, town lots or houses subject to exemptions as a home-
218. Id. at 1-2.
219. See Floor Debate on L.B. 60, 85th Legis., 1st Sess. 596 (Feb. 17, 1977) (unpub-
lished legislative record available on microfilm in office of Clerk of the Ne-
braska Legislature, LR #326) (remarks of Senator Fowler).
220. Under former law each head of a family (and thus each family) was entitled
to only one exemption in lieu of homestead and only one set of specific ex-
emptions. Act of Feb. 2, 1973, L.B. 16, §§ 1-2, 1973 Neb. Laws. 70 (previously
codified at NEB. RaV. STAT. §§ 25-1552, -1556 (Reissue 1975)) (repealed 1977).
Therefore, if the elimination of the family headship requirement was not in-
tended to affect the law as applied to families, each family and each single
individual not attached to a family would be entitled to only one exemption in
lieu of homestead and only one set of specific exemptions. For an interesting
and somewhat confusing case discussing a similar problem under Virginia
exemption law as applied in bankruptcy, see In re Thompson, 2 B.R. 380
(Bankr. Ct. ED. Va. 1980).
221. Johnson v. Bartek, 56 Neb. 422, 426, 76 N.W. 878, 880 (1898). See also William
v. Golden, 10 Neb. 432, 6 N.W. 766 (1880).
222. Woolfson v. Mead, 96 Neb. 528, 148 N.W. 153 (1914); People v. McClay, 2 Neb. 7
(1873).
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stead."223 Ownership of real property, without more, does not dis-
qualify a debtor from claiming the exemption-it is the ownership
of homestead property which renders the exemption in lieu of
homestead inapplicable.2 24 Therefore, the homestead exemption
and the exemption in lieu of homestead are mutually exclusive.225
In the case of a married couple, if the family is entitled to a home-
stead exemption, neither spouse may claim the exemption in lieu
of homestead without regard to the locus of title to the homestead
property. Thus, where the homestead is owned by the wife as her
separate property, her husband can not claim an exemption in lieu
of homestead.226 Moreover, the value (or lack of value) of the
debtor's interest in the homestead is of no consequence. 227 Nor
does it matter that the debtor owns only an equitable interest in
the homestead.228 In either case, if the debtor has an interest in
homestead property, he may not select the exemption in lieu of
homestead.
A related question, which appears not to have been raised in
Nebraska, is whether a debtor who rents residential property has a
homestead interest rendering him ineligible to claim the exemp-
tion in lieu of homestead. Although a homestead may be com-
posed of leasehold property,229 the courts should reject any
attempt by creditors (or trustees in bankruptcy) to argue that it
therefore follows that debtors who rent living space have a home-
stead and are thus not entitled to claim the exemption in lieu of
homestead. The fact that this question apparently has not arisen
in Nebraska is evidence that counsel for creditors must recognize
223. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Axtell v. Warden, 7 Neb. 182
(1878).
224. Widemair v. Woolsey, 53 Neb. 468, 73 N.W. 947 (1898) (plaintiff and his wife
owned business property and unoccupied lots, but no homestead; plaintiff eli-
gible for exemption in lieu of homestead).
225. See Foster, supra note 68, at 143.
226. Creason v. Wells, 158 Neb. 78, 62 N.W.2d 327 (1954); Stout v. Rapp, 17 Neb. 462,
23 N.W. 364 (1885). See also In re Nielsen's Estate, 135 Neb. 110, 280 N.W. 246
(1938). Notice that this result is not compelled by a literal reading of § 25-
1552, because that section grants an exemption in lieu of homestead to "[ajll
persons who have neither lands, town lots, or houses subject to exemptions
as a homestead." NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis ad-
ded).
227. State v. Townsend, 17 Neb. 530, 23 N.W. 509 (1885) (debtor was not entitled to
exemption in lieu of homestead notwithstanding that his homestead was sub-
stantially encumbered and he had only an equitable interest therein); State
v. Krumpus, 13 Neb. 321, 14 N.W. 409 (1882) (debtor was not entitled to ex-
emption in lieu of homestead notwithstanding that his homestead was a
"shanty" mortgaged for its full value).
228. State v. Townsend, 17 Neb. 530,23 N.W. 509 (1885); Axtell v. Warden, 7 Neb 182
(1878).
229. See notes 113, 117-18 & accompanying text supra.
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that this argument, although technically supportable, is irrational
as a matter of policy-acceptance of this argument would effec-
tively deny renters the protection of both the homestead exemp-
tion (since the average debtor's interest in his residential
leasehold is without substantial value) and the exemption in lieu
of homestead. Sound exemption policy requires that both the
homestead exemption and the exemption in lieu of homestead be
liberally construed 230 to permit renters who disavow any home-
stead interest in their leasehold to claim the exemption in lieu of
homestead.23 1
In nonbankruptcy proceedings, the debtor may claim the ex-
emption in lieu of homestead "at any time before the sale of the
property"232 by filing "an inventory, under oath, in the court where
the judgment is obtained, or with the officer holding the execution,
of the whole of the personal property owned by him,"233 together
with an affidavit "showing his right to the exemption claimed." 234
The debtor's personal property is then appraised,235 and the debtor
is permitted to set aside his exempt property.2 36 In bankruptcy
proceedings, the debtor or a dependent of the debtor may claim
the exemption in the list of exemptions filed pursuant to section
522(1) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.237
The present version of the exemption in lieu of homestead pro-
vides for an exemption of $2,500 in any "personal property, except
wages." 238 The exemption in lieu of homestead is, therefore, basi-
230. "Homestead and exemption laws are invariably construed liberally in favor
of the debtor who claims the protection of their provisions." Widemair v.
Woolsey, 53 Neb. 468, 470, 73 N.W. 947, 948 (1898). See note 86 supra (home-
stead law); State v. Bank of Crab Orchard, 122 Neb. 210, 239 N.W. 836 (1932)
(exemption in lieu of homestead).
231. See Widemair v. Woolsely, 53 Neb. 468,73 N.W. 947 (1898). The court held that
plaintiff was entitled to the exemption in lieu of homestead, because he did
not own any property "impressed with the character of a homestead." Id. at
470, 73 N.W. at 948. Although the court did not expressly discuss the question
presented in the text, it did note that the facts of the case disclosed that
"[p]laintiff and his wife lived in rented property, and at no time since their
marriage did they reside upon, or occupy as a home, any real estate belonging
to them, or either of them." Id. at 469, 73 N.W. at 947 (emphasis added).
232. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1553 (Reissue 1979).
233. Id.
234. First Nat'l Bank v. Lancaster, 54 Neb. 467, 471, 74 N.W. 858, 859 (1898). The
affidavit should state that the debtor is a resident of the State of Nebraska
and "[has] neither lands, town lots, nor houses exempt as a homestead." Id.
at 471-72, 74 N.W. at 859. See 5 MOORE, supra note 152, §§ 3694, 3695 (1966).
235. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1553 (Reissue 1979). See 5 MooRE, supra note 152, at
§§ 3694, 3696 (1966).
236. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1554 (Reissue 1979). See 5 MooRE, supra note 152, at
§§ 3694, 3697 (1966).
237. See note 153 supra.
238. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The amount of the exemption
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cally a wildcard or grubstake exemption, and the only apparent
limitation on the nature of the personalty of the debtor to which
the $2,500 exemption may be applied is that expressly stated in the
statute, i.e., the exemption may not be applied to wages.
2 3 9
All Nebraska debtors, both those entitled to the homestead ex-
emption and those entitled to the exemption in lieu of home-
stead,240 may exempt additionally the items of personal property
specifically enumerated in section 25-1556 of the Revised Statutes
of Nebraska.2 41 Most of the specific categories of exempt property
are designed to enable the debtor to hold, free from the claims of
his creditors, property necessary to protect him and his family
from impoverishment.242 For example, the debtor's specific ex-
emptions include: (1) the immediate personal possessions of the
debtor and his family;243 (2) all necessary wearing apparel of the
debtor and his family;244 (3) kitchen utensils and household furni-
ture not exceeding in value fifteen hundred dollars;245 (4) provi-
sions for the debtor and his family necessary for six months'
support;246 and (5) fuel necessary for six months. 247 At least some
of the specifically exempted property is intended to enable the
debtor to rehabilitate himself financially.248 Thus, in addition to
the categories of property already mentioned-many of which pro-
was increased from $1,500 to $2,500 in 1980. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, LB. 940, § 2,
1980 Neb. Laws 1051 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
However, many Nebraska debtors will not become entitled immediately to
the full benefit of the $1,000 increase under cases denying retroactive effect to
laws increasing the amount of exemptions. See notes 189-91 & accompanying
text supra.
239. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Lyons v. Austin, 126 Neb.
248, 252 N.W. 908 (1934) (exemption in lieu of homestead may not be applied
to wages not otherwise exempt); Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 84 Neb. 121, 125,
120 N.W. 946, 947 (1909) ("personal property" within the meaning of exemp-
tion in lieu of homestead includes "goods, chattels, coin, bills and evidences
of debt") (dictum); Mace v. Heath, 34 Neb. 54, 51 N.W. 317 (1892) (exemption
in lieu of homestead may be applied to judgment owing to debtor).
240. The specific personal property exemption may be claimed in addition to the
homestead exemption or the exemption in lieu of homestead, whichever is
applicable. Johnson v. Bartek, 56 Neb. 422, 76 N.W. 878 (1898); Williams v.
Golden, 10 Neb. 432, 6 N.W. 766 (1880); Axtell v. Warden, 7 Neb. 182 (1878)
(dictum); State v. Cunningham, 6 Neb. 90 (1877).
241. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1979). See note 213 supra.
242. See notes 214-18 & accompanying text supra.
243. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1979).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Clay Center State Bank v. McKelvie, 19 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1927); In re
Conley, 162 F. 806 (D. Neb. 1907).
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mote both subsistence of the family and debtor rehabilitation 249-
the debtor is permitted to retain "all equipment or tools used by
the debtor or his family for their own support not exceeding fifteen
hundred dollars in value."250
The present version of the specific exemption is less than
fifteen years old,251 and a substantial body of case law interpreting
its provisions has not yet developed. There are, therefore, many
areas of uncertainty concerning the scope of the categories of per-
sonal property specifically exempted by the provision. Suppose,
for example, that the debtor is a medical doctor and uses his auto-
mobile to make emergency house calls and to travel from his office
to the hospital. May hd exempt the automobile as "equipment or
tools" used to support himself?252 There is no clear answer to this
question; however, the starting point for the debtor's counsel is
clear-the specific exemptions are to be liberally construed in
favor of the person claiming the exemption.253
In re Conley2s 4 is an enlightening case in this regard. The bank-
rupt, a dealer in poultry, eggs, and farm produce, was allowed to
exempt "one horse and buggy and harness" under a former ver-
sion of the Nebraska specific exemption protecting "[t]he tools
and instruments of any mechanic, miner, or other person, used and
kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business." 255 The
horse and buggy qualified as part of the bankrupt's "tools and in-
249. For example, the exemption of all necessary wearing apparel of the debtor
obviously promotes the debtor's rehabilitation by enabling him to pursue in-
come producing opportunities with dignity.
250. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1979).
251. In 1969, the Unicameral undertook a major overhaul of the specific exemption
and replaced an overly specific and generally archaic provision with language
substantially similar to the present version. Act of June 9, 1969, LB. 1076, 1969
Neb. Laws 778 (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1979)).
Property exempt under the former statute included: (1) the family Bible, (2)
a seat or pew in any house or place or public worship, (3) one cow, three
hogs, and all pigs under six months old, and (4) if the debtor was "actually
engaged in the business of agriculture," one yoke of oxen, or a pair of horses;
ten sheep "and the wool therefrom"; three months food for the exempt live-
stock, one wagon, cart or dray two plows and one drag; "necessary gearing
for the team ... exempted"; and other farming implements not exceeding
fifty dollars in value. Act of Feb 12, 1866, 1866 Neb. Laws (repealed 1969) (pre-
viously codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1964)), reprinted in E.
ESTABROOK, II LAws, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS PASSED AT THE SESSIONS
OF THE TERRITORIAL AND STATE LEGISLATURES OF NEBRASKA 167-68 (1887).
252. See note 250 & accompanying text supra.
253. In re Bailey, 172 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1959); In re Conley, 162 F. 806 (D. Neb.
1907); Frazier v. Syas, 10 Neb. 115, 4 N.W. 934 (1880). See also State v. Cun-
ningham, 6 Neb. 90, 92-93 (1877) (statute exempting "one yoke of oxen, or pair
of horses" construed to allow debtor to exempt a team of mules).
254. 162 F. 806 (D. Neb. 1907).
255. Id. at 806.
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struments" because he used them in his business to make pickups
and deliveries. 256 The Conley case was cited approvingly by the
court in In re Bailey25 7 in support of its holding that the bankrupt,
a painting contractor, was entitled to exempt his panel truck,
which he used almost exclusively to transport painting supplies
and equipment to and from construction sites, as "a tool or instru-
ment kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business." 258
Although Conley and Bailey were not decided under the pres-
ent version of the specific exemption, the policy considerations
supporting their holdings apply with equal force to the hypotheti-
cal case involving the doctor's automobile. To borrow from the
court's logic in Bailey, if the doctor is denied the use of his auto-
mobile he will be about as effective in his profession as a cowboy,
on foot, attempting to round up range cattle.2 59 It follows that if
the policy of debtor rehabilitation is to be served fully by the occu-
pational equipment or tools exemption, both the doctor's automo-
bile and the cowboy's horse should be exempt.
There is no special statutory procedure prescribed for the
debtor to claim specific exemptions in nonbankruptcy proceed-
ings.260 Specific exemptions are claimed in bankruptcy in accord-
ance with the same procedure governing the homestead
exemption and the exemption in lieu of homestead.261
256. The court noted that the statute should receive a liberal construction "in or-
der that the heads of families may not be stripped of all means of making a
livelihood," id., and concluded that "[iut would not seem unreasonable that
the bankrupt should be allowed one horse and buggy and harness as exempt
to him under this statute as part of the tools and instruments of his trade or
business." Id. at 807. The court also cited with approval New York and New
Hampshire decisions construing similar statutes as exempting "[t]he buggy
used by a physican in his business." Id. Finally, the court cautioned that
"[w]hile the bankrupt is entitled to what tools and instruments are necessary
to carry on his trade or business, he is not entitled to all that might add con-
venience." Id. at 808.
257. 172 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1959).
258. Id. at 929.
259. Id. at 928. See also In re Goosey, 10 B.R. 285 (Bankr. Ct. D. Neb. 1981) (auto-
mobile of an insurance salesman was a "tool of the trade" under § 522(d) (6)
of the New Act).
260. Section 25-1556 provides simply that "[a]ll of the articles hereinbefore in-
tended to be exempt shall be chosen by the debtor, his agent, clerk or legal
representative, as the case may be." NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1979).
"An officer seizes property which is specifically exempt at his peril, and when
sued for refusing to seize such property on process, it would seem that he
might successfully defend himself by showing that it was specifically ex-
empt." Johnson v. Bartek, 56 Neb. 422,425-26, 76 N.W. 878, 880 (1898). See also
Mann v. Welton, 21 Neb. 541, 32 N.W. 599 (1887); 5 MOORE, supra note 152,
§ 3700.
261. See notes 153, 237 & accompanying text supra.
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2. Wage and Other Exemptions
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act generally excludes
from the estate in bankruptcy all property of the debtor acquired
after the commencement of the case.262 Moreover, wages earned
by an individual debtor for services performed after commence-
ment of the case are expressly excluded from the bankruptcy es-
tate.2 63 Thus, creditors may not look to future earnings of the
debtor for satisfaction of claims discharged by the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.264 However, wages earned before commencement of the
bankruptcy proceedings are included in the bankruptcy estate.2 65
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the applicability in bank-
ruptcy of wage exemption statutes.
In 1970 Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act266
to limit the amount of the earnings2 67 of an individual debtor which
may be subjected to garnishment.268 The Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act was designed to prevent consumers from being forced into
bankruptcy by a combination of harsh state garnishment laws and
predatory extensions of credit.269 Congress was also concerned
that "application of garnishment as a creditors' remedy frequently
results in loss of employment by the debtor."270 In general, the
262. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. IM 1979). But see id. § 541(a) (5)-(7).
263. Id. § 541(a) (6). It is essential to the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act that the debtor be left "free after the date of his petition to accumu-
late new wealth in the future." Segal v. Rochell, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1965).
However, if the debtor elects to file a wage-earner plan under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, his after-acquired property and post-petition
earnings will be included in the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (Supp.
1I 1979).
264. See 4 CoLiER, supra note 56, 541.05.
265. The debtor has a "legal or equitable interest" in wages that he or she has
earned by labor or services performed prior to commencement of the bank-
ruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1) (Supp. 11I 1979). See Aaron, supra note 11,
at 190. This was also true under § 70a of the Former Act 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1976) (repealed 1978). See In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Aveni v. Reckman, 409 U.S. 877 (1972); Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d
269 (5th Cir. 1966); In re Griffin, 1 B.R. 653 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Tenn. 1979);
Plumb, The Recommendations Of The Commission On The Bankruptcy
Laws-Exempt And Immune Property, 61 VA. L REV. 1, 20-21 (1975).
266. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
267. The term "earnings" is defined as "compensation paid or payable for personal
services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retire-
ment program." Id. § 1672(a) (1976).
268. The term "garnishment" is defined as "any legal or equitable procedure
through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for
payment of any debt" Id. § 1672(c).
269. See id. § 1671; Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1974).
270. 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (a) (2) (1976). Congress concluded that this loss of employ-
ment caused "disruption of employment, production, and consumption
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Consumer Credit Protection Act restricts wage garnishments to an
amount not exceeding the lesser of (a) twenty-five percent of the
debtor's disposable earnings 271 for any workweek or (b) the
amount by which disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty
times the federal minimum hourly wage.2 72 This federal response
to wage garnishment pre-empts all less restrictive state legisla-
tion,27 3 unless an exception for a particular state is made by regu-
lation of the Secretary of Labor after a determination that the laws
of that state provide restrictions on garnishment which are "sub-
stantially similar" to those provided by the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act.274 However, more restrictive state wage garnishment
laws are unaffected by the Consumer Credit Protection Act.275
In 1972 the Unicameral followed the lead of Congress and
amended the Nebraska wage garnishment statute to conform sub-
stantially to the Consumer Credit Protection Act.276 The Nebraska
act linits the amount of wages which may be subjected to garnish-
ment to the lesser of (a) twenty-five percent of the debtor's dispos-
able earnings for any workweek, (b) the amount by which
disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the federal
minimum hourly wage, or (c) if the debtor is a head of a family,277
[which] constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce." Id. Thus,
Congress exercised both its commerce and bankruptcy powers when it en-
acted the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.
642, 650 (1974).
271. The term "disposable earnings" is defined as "that part of the earnings of any
individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts
required by law to be withheld." 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b) (1976).
272. Id. § 1673(a). See 29 C.F.R. § 870.10 (1980).
273. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(c) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL 2.
274. 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (1976 & Supp. I 1979). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 870.50-.57 (1980).
275. 15 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1976). "Whichever law is the more restrictive and results
in the smaller garnishment is the one which must be applied in any given
situation." First Nat'l Bank v. Columbia Credit Corp., 179 Colo. 242, 246, 499
P.2d 1163, 1164 (1972). See also Evans v. Evans, 429 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Okla.
1976); Crane v. Crane, 417 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Okla. 1976);United States v. Du-
mont, 416 F. Supp 632 (D. Mont. 1976); Hodgson v. Hamilton Muncipal Court,
349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326
F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
276. Act of Mar. 30, 1972, L.B. 1032, § 133, 1972 Neb. Laws 333 (codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1558 (Reissue 1979)).
277. "Head-of a family" is statutorily defined as "an individual who actually sup-
ports and maintains one or more individuals who are closely connected with
him by blood relationship, relationship by marriage, by adoption, or by guard-
ianship, and whose right to exercise family control and provide for the depen-
dent individuals is based upon some moral or legal obligation." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1558(4) (d) (Reissue 1979). This definition has not yet been con-
strued by the Nebraska Supreme Court, and it is uncertain how it will be
applied to a married couple when both spouses are wage earners contributing
to the support of the household. For example, will both spouses be treated as
a head of a family, or will the court devise some means of determining which
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fifteen percent of his disposable earnings for that week.278
The Nebraska act is more restrictive than the Consumer Credit
Protection Act,279 because it gives additional protection (i.e., it pro-
vides greater limitations on wage garnishment) to debtors with de-
pendents. 280 Since wage garnishment laws are designed, at least
in part, to ensure that wage earners receive enough of their earn-
ings to meet the basic needs of their families,28' this policy is gen-
erally supportable, because, presumably, wage earners with
dependents incur more necessary expenses than do wage earners
without dependents. 2 82 However, in fairness to creditors, 283 the
Nebraska legislature ought to consider whether some limitation
should be placed on the extra protection from wage garnishment
provided heads of families. 284 For example, section 25-1558 might
be amended to provide that not more than fifteen percent of the
first $125 (or such other amount as the legislature considers to be
the appropriate ceiling) of the weekly disposable earnings of a
of the spouses is the head of the family? In the case of a working couple
without children, it could also be argued that neither spouse is the head of
the family, because each spouse is self-supporting. A legislative answer to
these questions is required; however, in the absence of such a response, the
courts should construe the family headship requirement liberally and in a
manner which insures that its purpose of protecting debtors with families is
fully effectuated.
278. Id. § 25-1558(1).
279. See notes 273-75 & accompanying text supra.
280. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1558(1) (c) (Reissue 1979).
281. See In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1973), affid sub nom.
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974); Vukowich, supra note 66, at 816.
282. See Vukowich, supra note 66, at 820. One commentator concludes that when
a wage garnishment statute "treats individuals without dependents the same
as persons supporting others [it follows] . . .either that the latter are being
treated inadequately or the former are granted protection in excess of that
which is necessary." Ulrich, supra note 15, at 135. The same commentator
has proposed that debtors with dependents should receive extra protection
from wage garnishment up to a designated ceiling-he suggests that the first
$500 of monthly disposable income should be subjected to varying degrees of
additional protection from garnishment according to the number of persons
dependent on the debtor-and that earnings above the ceiling should be sub-
jected to garnishment at the standard rate. Id. at 135. Another commentator
has suggested that "the percentage exemption could be increased five per-
cent for each dependent up to a maximum of three dependents and the mul-
tiple of the minimum hourly wage could be increased by five for each
dependent." Vukowich, supra note 66, at 820.
283. See Vukowich, supra note 66, at 781.
284. For example, it is difficult to argue that a person earning $1,000 per week re-
quires, or deserves, extra protection from wage garnishment in order to meet
the basic needs of his family. However, such a person is presently entitled to
special protection under the Nebraska wage garnishment statute, if he quali-
fies as the head of a family. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1558(1) (c) (Reissue 1979).
See Ulrich, supra note 15, at 135.
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head of a family could be subjected to garnishment, and that the
standard rate of garnishment would apply to earnings above the
ceiling.285
The legislature should also consider whether there are any cir-
cumstances in which the wage garnishment law fails to provide
sufficient protection to wage earners. For example, handicapped
persons and persons affected by illness in the family may need ad-
ditional income to meet their special needs.286 The current Ne-
braska wage garnishment statute is inflexible in this respect and
should be amended to permit debtors to exempt a greater portion
of their wages upon proof of special circumstances. 287
In bankruptcy proceedings, a Nebraska debtor may attempt to
exempt wages under either the Consumer Credit Protection Act or
section 25-1558.288 However, in Kokoszka v. Belord,289 the
Supreme Court implied, without clearly deciding, that the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act was not an exemption law within the
meaning of section 6 of the Former Act. The Kokozka Court rea-
soned that Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act
with a view to decreasing the number of consumer bankruptcies
by eliminating harsh, non-uniform garnishment laws and not for
the purpose of creating a new bankruptcy exemption.290 The same
rationale was expressed by the Ninth Circuit in In re Brissette,2 91
which clearly held that the Consumer Credit Protection Act did
not create an exemption under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.292
Kokoszka and Brissette appear to preclude the use of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act to exempt wages under section
522(b) (2) (A) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.293 Accordingly, the
issue in Nebraska bankruptcy proceedings is whether the Ne-
285. See note 282 supra.
286. See Vukowich, supra note 66, at 818.
287. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 723.051 (West 1980).
288. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2) (A) (Supp. 1I 1979) provides that the debtor may ex-
empt from the bankruptcy estate any property that is exempt under either
federal nonbankruptcy law or applicable state or local law. This section pro-
vides, in effect, the same exemptions formerly recognized by § 6 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1978). See Hughes, supra
note 5, at 1028 n.15; Neustadter, supra note 21, at 853; Ulrich, supra note 15, at
136; note 14 & accompanying text supra.
289. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
290. Id. at 650-51. See Plumb, supra note 265, at 21; Vukowich, supra note 5, at 791-
92.
291. 561 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1977).
292. The court stated: "The draftsmen of the CCPA were concerned only with the
problem of imposing uniform limitations on wage garnishment and did not
intend to create a federal bankruptcy exemption." Id. at 785.
293. See Ulrich, supra note 15, at 136-38. But see Aaron, supra note 11, at 190
("[piresumably ... the language of new section 522(b) (2) (A) encompasses
the Consumer Credit Protection Act").
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braska wage garnishment act constitutes a state exemption law for
purposes of incorporation in bankruptcy under section
522(b) (2) (A) of the New Act.2 9 The same question arose in Bris-
sette with respect to a former California statute which, in effect,
incorporated by reference the Consumer Credit Protection Act and
provided that earnings "shall be exempt from execution" to that
extent.295 In holding that the California statute was an exemption
statute for purposes of section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that the provision employed the term
"exempt" and had "been routinely treated as an exemption stat-
ute."296
Under the same analysis, the Nebraska wage garnishment stat-
ute appears to be a proper bankruptcy exemption. Although sec-
tion 25-1558(1) tracks the Consumer Credit Protection Act and
refers to the protection of wages "subject to garnishment,"297 the
magic word "exemption" is used in sections 25-1558(3) and 25-
1558(5).298 Moreover, wage garnishment laws in Nebraska tradi-
294. "The general rule is that unless the state law shields the protected property
against all forms of creditor process, it is not an exemption law, and the prop-
erty claimed as exempt passes to the trustee." Ulrich, supra note 15, at 136.
See also In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 1977); Plumb, supra note
265, at 21; Vukowich, supra note 66, at 788-92. State law controls the question
whether a particular state law is an exemption statute. In re Brissette, 561
F.2d 779,786 (9th Cir. 1977). See 1A COLLIER, supra note 48, 6.03, at 799-801.
But see Vukowich, supra note 66, at 789 n.60.
295. 561 F.2d at 785 n.10, 786.
296. Id. at 786. The court noted that the effect of its decision was to permit the
Consumer Credit Protection Act to become a bankruptcy exemption "for all
practical purposes via California law." Id. Circuit Judge Hufstedler de-
fended the logic of this interpretation:
The process of double adoption, however, is entirely consistent with
Bankruptcy Act policy. The CCPA purports to do only what Califor-
nia permits it to do-namely, to set the levels of maximum garnish-
ment. The California statute continues to function as an exemption
statute, both for the purposes of state law and for the purposes of
Section 6. Section 6 adopts, as an exemption, any state law which
would shield the property in question from execution by a creditor in
a non-bankruptcy proceeding and thus adopts California's adoption
of the CCPA.
Id.
297. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1558(1) (Reissue 1979).
298. Section 25-1558(3) provides: "No court shall make, execute, or enforce any
order or process in violation of this section. The exemptions allowed in this
section shall be granted to any person so entitled without any further pro-
ceedings." Id. § 25-1558(3) (emphasis added). The last quoted sentence is
not contained in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Similarly, section 25-
1558(5), which also is not part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, pro-
vides: "Every assignment, sale, transfer, pledge, or mortgage of the wages or
salary of an individual which is exempted by this section, to the extent of the
exemption provided by this section, shall be void and unenforceable by any
process of law." Id. § 25-1558(5) (emphasis added).
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tionally have been recognized as creating exemptions from all
forms of creditor process. 299
Even without resort to this mode of analysis, if deference is
given to policy, section 25-1558 should be construed as a bank-
ruptcy exemption. Section 25-1558 is designed to ensure that wage
earners retain enough of their income to meet the basic needs of
their families. 30 0 This purpose is completely consistent with the
bankruptcy policy of affording "debtors protection from their cred-
itors in bankruptcy pursuant to provisions of state law."'30 ' More-
over, the Consumer Credit Protection Act was enacted solely to
"set the levels of maximum garnishment" 302 and was not intended
to otherwise affect the functioning of state wage exemption law. 303
Therefore, the fact that section 25-1558 is modeled on the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act should not prevent it from being
treated as an exemption in bankruptcy under section 522 (b) (2) (A)
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
This analysis of Nebraska exemption law has focused on the
primary exemptions of most general application created by state
law-the homestead exemption, the exemption in lieu of home-
stead, the specific personal property exemption and the wage ex-
emption. However, in counseling debtors who are contemplating
bankrutpcy, practitioners should also consider the potential signif-
icance of exemptions not discussed in this article. These addi-
tional exemptions include certain insurance cash values and
benefits,30 4 all annuities or benefits payable under the State Em-
ployees Retirement Act, 305 and certain burial lots, crypts, tombs or
vaults if used solely for burial purposes and not with a view to
profit.3 0 6
299. For example, the former Nebraska wage garnishment statute, which was re-
pealed following enactment of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, was
clearly an exemption statute. It provided in pertinent part:
The wages of all persons who are heads of families, in the hands of
those by whom such persons may be employed, both before and after
such wages shall be due, shall be exempt from the operation of at-
tachmen4 execution and garnishee process to the extent of eighty-
five per cent of the amount of such wages ....
Act of Feb 20, 1969, L.B. 73, § 1, 1969 Neb. Laws 779 (repealed 1972) (previously
codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1558 (Cum. Supp. 1969)) (repealed 1972) (em-
phasis added). See also Live Stock Nat'l Bank v. Jackson, 137 Neb. 161, 288
N.W. 515 (1939).
300. See note 281 & accompanying text supra.
301. In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779, 787 (9th Cir. 1977).
302. Id. at 786.
303. See id. See also Aaron, supra note 11, at 190-91.
304. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-371, -754, -1029 (Reissue 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
305. See id. § 84-1324 (Reissue 1976).
306. See id. §§ 12-517, -605 (Reissue 1974).
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II. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act establishes a somewhat disingenu-
ous exemption policy that first creates, and then allows the individ-
ual states to nullify, uniform federal bankruptcy exemptions. The
State of Nebraska has chosen to opt out of the federal exemption
scheme thereupon assuming a continuing moral obligation to en-
sure that its exemption policy does not deny Nebraska debtors the
fresh start following bankruptcy to which they are entitled. The
Unicameral should undertake an immediate reconsideration of Ne-
braska exemption law with a view to possible elimination of the
homestead exemption in favor of an expanded exemption in lieu of
homestead to be available to all debtors without regard to marital
or family status and applicable to real as well as personal property.
The legislature should also consider whether any increase in the
amount of the exemption in lieu of homestead is justified, whether
such amount should be indexed to reflect changes in the cost of
living from time to time, and whether special consideration should
be given to debtors who support one or more dependents. Finally,
the Unicameral ought to consider whether the Nebraska wage gar-
nishment statute should be amended to limit the additional protec-
tion given to affluent heads of families and to increase the
protection accorded wage earners afflicted with handicaps, illness,
or other hardships.
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